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
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
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
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PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR



HOSTED BY
MAJOR GENERAL HERBERT E. WOLFF
COMMANDER
UNITED STATES ARMY WESTERN COMMAND
FORT SHAFTER, HAWAII 96858

SEMINAR CHAIRMAN
COLONEL NOLAN M. SIGLER
DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF
UNITED STATES ARMY WESTERN COMMAND

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PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - III

14-18 January 1980

Honolulu, Hawaii

COUNTRIES REPRESENTED

People's Republic of Bangladesh

Dominion of Fiji

French Republic*

Republic of Indonesia

Japan*

Republic of Korea

Malaysia

New Zealand

Papua New Guinea

Republic of the Philippines

Republic of Singapore

Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka
(Featured Speaker)

Kingdom of Thailand

Kingdom of Tonga

United States of America

*OBSERVERS

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR

ATTENDEES

BANGLADESH

Col SIRAJUL Haque, Director of Movement and Quartering,
Bangladesh Army

Lt Col Mohammad Abdus SALAM, General Staff Officer (Planning),
Military Operations Directorate, Bangladesh Army

FIJI

Lt Col Lindsay G. WILLIAMS, Chief of Staff, Royal Fiji Military
Forces

FRANCE (Observer Status)

Lt Col Gerard LAGANE, Assistant Chief of Staff, Superior Command
in French Polynesia, Center of Nuclear Experiments, Command
of the Pacific Maritime Zone

INDONESIA

Col NANA Narundana, Deputy Commander, Territorial Development
Center, Education and Training Command

Lt Col Herman Bernhard Leopold MANTIRI, Director of Training
at the Infantry Center, Education and Training Command

Lt Col Maniur PASARIBU, Lecturer, Army Command and Staff College

Lt Col Donnie D. PEARCE, USA, Chief, Army Division, US
Defense Liaison Group, Indonesia

JAPAN (Observer Status)

Maj Mitsuru KUSHIYA, Operations Division, Plans and Operations
Department, Ground Self Defense Force

Mr. Myron H. BOLOTIN, United States Mutual Defense Office, Tokyo

Lt Col Glenn D. HOLLIS, Chief, Operations and Training, Assistant
Chief of Staff, G3, US Army Japan

KOREA

Col SUNG Yun Young, Chief, Administration Division, DCSPER,
Republic of Korea Army

Lt Col YIM Chong Soon, Armor Operations and Plans Officer,
DCSOPS, Republic of Korea Army

Maj LEE San Sun, Logistics and Education Planning Officer,
DCSLOG, Republic of Korea Army

Lt Col Joe S. FALKNER, Jr., USA, Army Division, JUSMAG, Korea

MALAYSIA

Lt Col Mohammed ARIFF bin Ali, Directing Staff, Armed Forces
Staff College

Lt Col HEW King Thiam, Directing Staff, Armed Forces Staff
College

NEW ZEALAND

Lt Col Bruce G. JENKIN, Director of Plans, Operations and
Mobilization, Army General Staff, Defence Headquarters

Lt Col Evan J. TORRANCE, Director of Army Training, Army
General Staff, Defence Headquarters

PAPUA NEW GUINEA

Lt Col Lima DOTAONA, Commander, 2d Battalion, Pacific Islands
Regiment

Lt Col A.R. HUAI, Director of Land Operations

PHILIPPINES

Col Felix A. BRAUNER, Jr., Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3,
Philippine Army

Col Dalmacio G. PIZANA, Jr., Assistant Chief of Staff, G-6,
Philippine Army

Lt Col Virgilio M. DAVID, Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-3, HQ Philippine Constabulary

Lt Col Herbert G. THOMS, USA, Chief, Ground Forces Service
Section and Plans Officer, JUSMAG Philippines

SINGAPORE

Brigadier General TAN Chin Tiong, Deputy Chief General Staff
(Policy) and Assistant Chief of General Staff (Plans)

Maj CHEN Chin Chi, Chief, Force Plans Branch, G-5

CPT George YEO, Weapons Staff Officer, Air Plans Department, G-5

Col John M. FITZGERALD, USA, Army Attache, American Embassy,
Singapore

SRI LANKA

Major General J.E.D. PERERA, Commander, Sri Lanka Army, (Featured
Speaker)

THAILAND

Col PRAMON Palasin, Directorate of Operations, Royal Thai Army

Col THAWAN Sawaengpan, Instructor, Command and General Staff
College

Col CHOOCHART Hiranraks, Office of the Comptroller, Royal Thai
Army

Col John F. BEHNEMAN, USA, Chief, Army Division, JUSMAGTHAI

TONGA

(Sub Lt) H.R.H. Prince MA'ATU, Accounts Officer, Comptroller
General

UNITED STATES

General John A. WICKHAM, Jr., Commander in Chief, United
Nations Command, Republic of Korea/United States Combined
Forces Command; Commander, United States Forces,
Korea, Commander, Eighth United States Army

Admiral Robert L.J. LONG, Commander in Chief, Pacific Command

Lieutenant General Glenn K. OTIS, Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations and Plans, Department of the Army

UNITED STATES continued

Lt Col Norman L. CUSTARD, Assistant Director, Security Assistance Training Management Office (SATMO), Fort Bragg, NC

Lt Col(P) John G. GERGULIS, Chief, Contingency Plans Division, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg NC

Lt Col Peter A. KIND, Chief, Concepts and Studies Division, Combat Developments Directorate, US Army Signal Center, Fort Gordon, GA

Lt Col(P) George W. TATE, Director, NCO Training, Deputy Chief of Staff - Training, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, VA

United States Army Western Command

Major General Herbert E. WOLFF, Commander

Col Charles C. SPEROW, Chief of Staff

Col Nolan M. SIGLER, Deputy Chief of Staff

Col Robert H. BOTTS, Deputy Chief of Staff for Communications - Electronics

Col Emory W. BUSH, Deputy Chief of Staff for Reserve Affairs

Col William G. GUSTAFSON, Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics

Col Norbert W. KOZIATEK, Inspector General

Col Robert J. McCAFFREE, Deputy Chief of Staff - Comptroller

Col James F. McCARTHY, SR., Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans

Col John R. MEESE, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence

Col George C. OGDEN, Jr., Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

Col Robert J. WALLACE, Assistant Chief of Staff for Automation Management

UNITED STATES continued

United States Army Western Command continued

Mr. Wilfred J. CURLEY, Assistant Chief of Staff for Acquisition Management (Procurement)

Lt Col Thomas G. THOMPSON, Chief, Strategy, Policy, International Relations and Security Assistance Division (SPIRSA)
ODCSOPS

Lt Col Sidney E. LANDRUM, PAMS Secretariat, SPIRSA Div,
ODCSOPS

Lt Col Karl P. PIOTROWSKI, North East Asia Area Officer,
SPIRSA Div, ODCSOPS

Lt Col Ronald D. TURNER, ANZUS/Oceania Area Officer, SPIRSA
Div, ODCSOPS

Maj Lawrence H. TIFVERMAN, South East Asia Area Officer,
SPIRSA Div, ODCSOPS

Maj (P) Robert K. TYSON, Plans Officer, ODCSOPS

Mr. Merlin E. OLSON, International Logistics Specialist,
ODCSLOG

IX Corps (AUG)

Col H. K. OYAMA, Deputy Chief of Staff - G-3

MAJ Gaylen NARIMATSU, Commander, 100th Battalion

25th Infantry Division

Lt Col George F. VICKERS, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3

Lt Col Curtis J. HERRICK, Jr., Chief of Maneuver Group, G-3

Maj Stephen J. PAEK, Assistant G-3

Maj Anthony H. NORMAND, S-3, 1st Brigade

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - III

14-18 January 1980

HONOLULU, HAWAII

AGENDA

Pacific Armies Management Seminar III
14-18 January 1980
Honolulu, Hawaii

AGENDA

Monday, 14 Jan 80

0800-0915	Registration
0915-0920	Call to Order, Administrative Remarks, COL Nolan M. Sigler, Seminar Chairman
0920-0940	Welcoming Remarks and Introductions- Major General Herbert E. Wolff, Commander, US Army Western Command
0940-1010	Keynote Speaker, GEN John A. Wickham, Jr., Commander in Chief, United Nations Command; Commander in Chief, Republic of Korea/United States Combined Forces Command; Commander, United States Forces Korea; Commander, Eighth United States Army
1010-1020	Question and Answer Period
1020-1100	Official Photograph (See Group Photo Assignment Handout) and Refreshment Break
1100-1130	Panel Organization Meeting
1130-1300	Lunch
1300-1345	Featured Speaker, Major General J.E.D. Perera, Commander, Sri Lanka Army
1345-1430	Presentation: "Civic Action" LTC Dotaona and LTC Huai, Papua New Guinea
1430-1445	Refreshment Break
1445-1530	Presentation: "Training Soldiers for Civilian Trades" Lieutenant A. F. Ma'atu, Tonga
1530-1630	PAMS Planning Committee Meeting

Monday, 14 Jan 80 continued

1840-1900 Enroute to Ft Shafter. First bus departs 1840 hours from Hale Koa main entrance. Last bus departs 1845 hours, same location.

1900-2100 Commander's Reception at Quarters 5, Palm Circle, Ft Shafter.

2100-2130 Enroute to Hale Koa. First bus departs at 2100 hours, Quarters 5, Palm Circle, Ft Shafter. Last bus departs at 2115 hours.

Tuesday, 15 Jan 80

0755- Call to Order, Administrative Announcements

0800-0845 Presentation: "Fundamentals of Staff Organization and Functions" LTC Ariff and LTC Hew, Malaysia

0845-0930 Presentation: "Planning and Managing a National Service Army" MAJ Chen and CPT Yeo, Singapore

0930-0945 Refreshment Break

0945-1030 Presentation: "Task Organization of Forces" COL Pramon, Thailand

1030-1115 Presentation: "Application of Management Techniques to Operational Planning" COL Brawner, Philippine Army

1115-1200 Presentation: "Management Approach to Contingency Planning" LTC(P) John G. Gergulis, XVIII Airborne Corps, Ft Bragg, N.C.

1200-1300 Lunch

1300-1530 Panel Discussion: "Operational Planning"

1530-1630 Steering Committee Meeting

Wednesday, 16 Jan 80

0755- Call to Order, Administrative Announcements

Wednesday, 16 Jan 80 continued

0800-0900	Panel Presentation: "Operational Planning"
0900-0945	Presentation: "Training and Operations of UN Peacekeeping Forces" LTC L.G. Williams, Fiji
0945-1000	Refreshment Break
1000-1045	Presentation: "Operations Management of Territorial Forces" COL Nana, Indonesia
1045-1115	Presentation: "Training and Operations Update" LTC(P) George W. Tate, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, Ft Monroe, VA
1115-1200	Presentation: "Planning and Controlling CPX" LTC George F. Vickers and LTC Curtis J. Herrick, Jr., 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, HI
1200-1300	Lunch (Planning Committee Meeting - working lunch)
1300-1345	Presentation: - "Operations Planning and Communications" LTC Peter A. Kind, US Army Signal Center, Ft Gordon, GA
1345-1615	Panel Discussion: "Operations Management"
1830-2130	Optional Dinner and Show - Tama's Hula Nani Show, Hale Koa Hotel

Thursday, 17 Jan 80

0755-	Call to Order, Administrative Announcements
0800-0900	Panel Reports: "Operations Management"
0900-0915	Refreshment Break
0915-1000	Presentation: "Automation in Planning and Operations Management" Colonel Robert J. Wallace, US Army Western Command
1000-1200	Automation, Communications - Electronic and Engineer Display/Demonstration, Kalani USAR Center

Thursday, 17 Jan 80 continued

1200-1300	Lunch
1300-1345	Presentation: "The Training and Education Management Program for the ROK Officer Corps" COL Sung, Korea
1345-1600	Panel Discussion: "Special and Combined Operations"
1600-1800	Optional Trip to Hickam AFB Post Exchange. Buses depart Hale Koa at 1600 and 1630 hours and return 1700 and 1800 hours.

Friday, 18 Jan 80

0755-	Call to Order, Administrative Announcements
0800-0900	Panel Reports: "Special and Combined Operations"
0900-0930	Featured Speaker: Lieutenant General Glenn K. Otis, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Headquarters, Department of the Army
0930-0945	Question and Answer Period
0945-1000	Refreshment Break
1000-1130	Panel Discussion: "Final Report"
1130-1200	Steering Committee Meeting
1200-1330	Lunch
1330-1400	Featured Speaker: Admiral Robert L.J. Long, Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Command.
1400-	Closing Remarks by Country Senior Representatives.
1900-2200	PAMS Dinner and Program, Waikiki Ballroom, Hale Koa Hotel, Major General Wolff, Commander, US Army Western Command, Closing Remarks

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - III

14-18 January 1980

HONOLULU, HAWAII

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The third Pacific Armies Management Seminar hosted by US Army Western Command met in Honolulu 14-13 January 1980. The seminar theme was Operations Planning and Management, emphasizing management techniques used by participating nations to plan and manage operations. Efforts were directed at developing a greater understanding of the close relationship among training management, the PAMS I theme; resource management, the PAMS II theme; and the PAMS III theme of operations planning and management. Participants from Bangladesh, Fiji, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Tonga, Thailand, the United States and observers from France and Japan attended. In addition, Major General J.E.D. Perera, Commander, Sri Lanka Army, represented his army in the opening day's activities. As with previous seminars, PAMS delegates made presentations, met in smaller panel discussion groups and reported the results of their discussions to the plenary sessions.

Major General Herbert E. Wolff, Commander of US Army Western Command and the official host, opened PAMS III with welcoming remarks and introduced the country delegations and the keynote speaker, General John A. Wickham, Jr., Commander in Chief, United Nations Command; Commander in Chief, Republic of Korea/United States Combined Forces Command; Commander, United States Forces Korea and Commander, Eighth United States Army. In his keynote address, General Wickham focused on Korea and illustrated defense planning problems that are common to many armies. General Wickham said that defense planners must recognize national constraints, analyze threat force capabilities, take advantage of capabilities that are unique to each nation and develop a coherent defense concept that complements defense contributions of friendly and allied nations. A copy of General Wickham's remarks is included in the PAMS III Final Report.

The highlight of the first afternoon session was a featured address by Major General J.E.D. Perera, Commander, Sri Lanka Army. General Perera addressed the role of his army in national development and his army's contribution in building arterial roads, airstrips, and water conservation and control projects. In his concluding remarks, General Perera stated that commanders and managers should be careful to avoid prolonged involvement in these type projects or risk a reduction in military mission efficiency and undermining civilian

initiatives. Complementary presentations on "Military Civic Action in Papua New Guinea and "Training Tongan Soldiers for Civilian Trades" completed the first day's activities.

"Operations Planning" was the topic for the second day. Malaysia began the day's activities with a presentation on the "Fundamentals of Staff Organization and Functions." Succeeding presentations on "Planning and Managing a National Service Army" by Singapore, "Task Organization of Forces" by Thailand, "Application of Management Techniques to Operations Planning" by the Philippines and a US Army presentation on the XVIII Airborne Corps' "Management Approach to Contingency Planning" provided the basis for discussions of operations planning. In discussing operations planning, attendees concluded that resources often define feasible options, that the best plans are usually relatively simple, contain innovative thought, tie training, operations and resources together, and serve as a vehicle to organize and control coordinated efforts. Planning invariably involves the establishment of priorities among services and competing activities, and are based upon national priorities, threat capabilities, and the resources available. For complete details see panel reports.

"Operations Management" was the topic for the third day. A presentation by Fiji on "Training and Operations of UN Peacekeeping Forces" and a presentation by Indonesia on "Operations Management of Territorial Forces" and US Army presentations on "Operations Planning and Communications"; "Planning and Controlling CPXs" and "Training and Operations Update" formed the basis for discussions of operations management. In discussing operations management, attendees concluded that a sound training plan is a prerequisite to effective training. Managers establish training objectives based upon desired operational capabilities and review training program progress by using common standards such as the US Army's Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) or by conducting command post and/or field training exercises. Doctrine, standard procedures and established operational techniques materially contribute to effective operations management by reducing confusion, simplifying control and improving operations coordination. For complete details, see panel reports.

On the fourth day, attendees heard presentations on "Automation in Planning and Operations Management" and "The Training and Education Management Program for the ROK Army Officer Corps" and viewed automatic data processing, communications-electronics and engineer displays and

demonstrations. The discussion topic for the day was "Special and Combined Operations," to include military contributions to nation building and civic action projects. Attendees concluded that, although standardization of equipment is unlikely, standardization of doctrine and operational procedures are viable undertakings. In discussing the military's role in nation building and civic action projects, attendees concluded that military units can materially assist in nation building by developing a sense of national pride as well as contributing to civilian development efforts. At the same time, the military must be sensitive to the impact of their efforts on civilian initiative and guard against loss of operational capabilities for national defense. For complete details, see panel reports.

The final seminar day was devoted to panel reports and featured addresses by Lieutenant General Glenn K. Otis, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Department of the Army and Admiral Robert L.J. Long, Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Command. General Otis addressed operations planning related to forward deployment of US forces, and the US rapid deployment force as well as modernization and management efforts required by these actions. In his remarks, General Otis observed that every nation must analyze its defense requirements based on the threat to be countered, the conditions under which its forces will be employed as well as resources allocated, then produce a viable and balanced force capable of meeting all defense requirements. A copy of General Otis' remarks will be published in an addendum to the PAMS III Final Report. In his PAMS III address, Admiral Long noted the dominant role of ground forces within the military structure of Asia-Pacific nations, cited the value of cooperative efforts such as the Pacific Armies Management Seminar and addressed the military, economic and political environment of the Asia-Pacific region against the background of recent events in Iran and Afghanistan. A copy of Admiral Long's address is contained in this report.

In their closing remarks, the senior representatives from each country cited the value of the Pacific Armies Management Seminar series. They noted that PAMS provides a beneficial forum for exchanging management ideas, promoting understanding and fostering good relations among professional soldiers of the Asia-Pacific region. In the course of the seminar, several points surfaced repeatedly. Among these was the consensus that there is an urgent need for greater cooperation among the nations and armies of the Asia-Pacific region. Attendees unanimously agreed that the Pacific Armies Management Seminar contributes to this cooperative process and provides a vehicle for productive discussion on ways to improve future cooperation.

The PAMS IV Planning Committee recommended, and the Steering Committee concurred, that PAMS IV be held either in Manila or Honolulu in November or December 1980. The specific date and location will be established in mid-March 1980 after coordination by the PAMS Secretariat and then will be passed to all Asia-Pacific army representatives. The overall theme selected for PAMS IV is "Insurgency" including the application of ground force internal security/defense capabilities to latent and active insurgencies, the domestic socio-economic and external origins of insurgency, and preventive and remedial measures. Adjunct topics approved by the committees as supporting sub-topics were "mobilization management," "territorial management" and "interoperability." For complete details, see the Steering/Planning Committee Report.

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - III

14-18 January 1980

HONOLULU, HAWAII

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

. Military forces are the servants of the people and the government that they serve.

. The ultimate purpose of defense planning is to develop a defense capability and sufficient preparedness that will serve as a deterrent to war.

. A coherent defense concept must precede planning and implementation. The critical factors are the threat, national interests and resources, collective defense arrangements and support expected from friendly and allied nations.

. When ~~forces~~ doctrines, weapons and logistics systems are interoperable among combined national forces, the strength of the whole tends to be greater than the sum of the parts.

. Defense planners must maximize intelligence to gain early warning and take advantage of unique national capabilities such as terrain and industrial effectiveness.

. Assessment is the first essential step in the management process. It provides a logical formulation of alternatives.

. Management techniques applied to the planning and operations process are situational. Resource constraints and socio-economic pressures on organizational objectives often require expedient solutions as opposed to optimum solutions.

. Plans must be dynamic and flexible -- and not inhibit creative thinking. Planners must be aware of their resource constraints and strengths and develop plans which employ their strengths against threat weaknesses.

. Effective planning is characterized by careful analysis of the value returned from resource employment in alternative courses of action.

. The best plans are usually relatively simple, facilitate deliberate efforts by all agencies, facilitate coordination, allocate resources and permit flexibility.

. A plan provides a starting point, gathers necessary facts and develops a design or scheme of action to accomplish a stated objective. It is a logical, sequential thought process used to train, prepare for, and control operations.

. Contingency planning is a continuous process, characterized by innovative thinking, that must be continuously updated in light of evolving international politics. Completed contingency plans must not lull commanders and managers into a false sense of security.

. Within operational constraints, delegation of authority and use of mission type orders is an effective management technique. This permits subordinates maximum flexibility and stimulates innovative thought and initiative.

. Subordinate planners require planning early in the planning process to allow adequate reaction time to develop their implementing plans. Often the higher headquarters allocates insufficient time for this task.

. A direct relationship exists among planning, training and operations management. Each is influenced by resources (time, terrain, materiel and troops) available. Plans serve to tie these activities together, guide training efforts, convey information and direct coordinated operations.

. The Commander's guidance should be stated in terms that allow subordinate commanders to choose one of several general courses of action and allow subordinates the flexibility necessary to exercise initiative and command prerogatives.

. The complexity of today's weapons systems increases the requirement for integrated command and control systems. Milestone planning and time-phased sequencing are effective tools in the operations management process.

. Command and control of operations are best facilitated by doctrine, standard operating procedures (SOPs), written operations orders, use of phases and/or milestones, rapid and effective communications, and supervision by the commander and staff.

. One of the most important methods of command and control is a personal visit to the operational area by the commander.

. Field tested doctrine substantially contributes to operational effectiveness, simplifies control, improves coordination and reduces confusion. Doctrine should be dynamic, not dogmatic

. Effective communication is the key to operational success. Management techniques that maintain open channels of communication and do not restrict the flow of information are critical to effective management.

. In operations management one must consider unity of command, span of control, centralized or decentralized planning and control, manpower management, morale and flexibility.

. The principles and techniques of operations management include establishing goals and objectives, establishing priorities, delineating responsibilities, delegating authority and allocating resources.

. In combined operations, consideration must be given to cultural and social considerations, language differences and political sensitivities.

. CPX's are excellent for training headquarters elements, developing operational and logistics procedures and improving communications. FTX's should follow from CPX's for training troop units. In addition, the FTX is the only real way to test the logistic staff and other support agencies.

. Training involves the upgrading and development of human resources. The realistic training of soldiers is essential to the success of any plan or operation.

. Ad hoc committees are effective in addressing complex, unique or multi-faceted planning or operational problems that are outside the normal area of responsibility of any one functional staff office of activity.

. In organizations below division level, the permanent staff is the best organization to accomplish staff actions and management of operations.

. Rear area security, as a special operation, is an economy of force operation, requiring one commander who has overall responsibility, a staff to assist, and necessary resources to adequately accomplish the mission.

. Military forces make significant contributions to the nation building process by providing leadership training for future national leaders, teaching civilian skills and developing national unity and pride.

. The will and sensitivities of the people must be considered in all civic action projects. Their participation and contributions in form of labor, material or project selection provides the involvement necessary for success.

. Care should be exercised to preclude military involvement in civic action projects that degrade operational effectiveness or that undermine civilian initiative. Long-term involvement in civic action projects can reduce military efficiency and morale.

. Minor civic action projects can often be combined with programmed operations and training activities to enhance civil-military relations. Other activities found to be effective include base open-houses, equipment displays, training demonstrations and civil-military relations standing committees.

. Good civil-military relations are critical to the long term success of all military operations. Civic action projects are most effective in remote, less-secure areas.

. Standardization and interoperability among friendly and allied armies is a necessity in order to gain a force multiple advantage.

. Exchange of instructors, liaison officers and students encourages standardization of doctrine and staff procedures.

. Manpower, as a resource, not only determines the size of the armed forces but also controls the rate of modernization for any developing country.

. Universal military training is a valuable tool for developing patriotism and pride in a nation.

. The major role of reserves (or territorial forces) is to augment regular forces, save money and manpower, and provide a force to augment local authorities.

. Reserve forces must be capable of integration into regular forces in a timely and efficient manner.

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - III

14 January 1980

OPENING REMARKS

MAJOR GENERAL HERBERT E. WOLFF
COMMANDER, US ARMY WESTERN COMMAND

OPENING REMARKS

Good morning, Aloha and welcome to the third Pacific Armies Management Seminar. I am extremely pleased to see the excellent turnout we have today. I see several familiar faces in our assembly today; and over the next several days, I am looking forward to meeting each of you. To those who are attending PAMS for the first time, I extend a warm welcome and am pleased to have you join us.

Some of you came early last week to observe the 25th Infantry Division's Tropic Lightning Command Post Exercise. You found that we had an extremely violent storm which ultimately forced us to cancel the exercise. I would point out that the disaster relief operations we conducted in place of the command post exercise are not part of our normal programming. But it certainly provided us realistic training and showed that we can cope with that particular type contingency.

As I pointed out at the last of these PAMS sessions, I would like to be able to greet each of you in your native language, but will follow the procedure of past seminars and confine my remarks to what I call the American version of the English language. We appreciate that to many of you, English is a second language; but, in previous seminars we found the common background we share in the profession of arms transcends any particular language. I am looking forward to our PAMS III sessions and am confident that we will have a very useful and fruitful seminar.

We recognize that many of you have traveled great distances and may be in Hawaii for the first time. The information brochure that you received in your welcome packet was prepared with this in mind and will answer many of your routine questions. I also call your attention to the welcome desk set up outside this room. The people at that desk have the mission of assisting you in any way they can. They will make every effort to make your visit to Hawaii and to the seminar a professionally rewarding and personally enjoyable time. With your help, my staff and I are confident that we can make the next few days a memorable experience for you. If you need any assistance, we ask that you let us know.

For those of you who are with us for the first time, let me review some of the reasons for initiating the Pacific Armies Management Seminar series and why we attach importance to it.

Traditionally, opportunities to meet and discuss professional military subjects have led to greater understanding and rapport among soldiers. However, in the period immediately preceding initiation of the PAMS series, opportunities for army-to-army contacts between the US Army and many other armies of the Asia-Pacific region had declined appreciably and were limited except in Korea and Japan. Against this background, we felt it was imperative that we take steps to reverse the trend; therefore, we developed a program to expand army-to-army contacts through increased staff visits, exchanges and stop-overs in Hawaii for personnel returning from US training. Finally, we proposed to host a series of professional military seminars called the Pacific Armies Management Seminar.

Some of you were here for our very first PAMS session. We discussed training management. We sought to identify and to share techniques to improve training realism and operational readiness in our respective armies. We addressed common problems such as insufficient funds to buy all the training ammunition we need and found that simulation devices can compensate for part of the shortage. We looked at insufficient training and maneuver space, and found that manual and computer assisted war gaming techniques are of value to us. We underscored the need for realistic training and were successful in identifying solutions to many commonly shared training problems. For our second seminar, "Resource Management" was our topic, and we identified-as well as shared-management techniques used by participating armies to maximize results from constrained and declining resources. We agreed that time was one of our most precious commodities. We branched out to discuss national strategy and its impact on resources. We agreed that trade-offs occur of necessity between near-term readiness and long-term modernization.

This week our theme is "Operations Planning and Management," and naturally some of you will discover that the topics of our two previous PAMS sessions are closely related to our discussions this week. I refer to the correlation of how we employ our resources, where the training emphasis lies, and what operational capabilities we expect to achieve. All are directly related to operational readiness and the plans we prepare to implement national policy. In the management process, planning ties it all together and is shaped by the realities of resources and training management and resultant operational capabilities.

We are indebted to the attendees at PAMS I who helped successfully launch this series in September 1978 and to the PAMS

II attendees who built upon the success of PAMS I. Both contributed their talents, freely shared their expertise, and built a firm foundation for the PAMS series. We have important work to do and high standards to match. I am confident that you will be equal to the challenge and that you will make this session even more successful. That is a pretty tall order, but that is the challenge and the standard against which we will be measured.

At this time, I would like to introduce the Asia-Pacific delegations we have at this third Pacific Armies Management Seminar. As I call your name, I ask that you stand so that we may recognize you. I'd like to point out that eight of the nations here today were among our original PAMS attendees and have attended all of our PAMS sessions. They deserve our special thanks and appreciation. I also want to thank the Commander in Chief, Pacific Command and his staff. It is not for their support and encouragement, PAMS would not have been possible. We appreciate the assistance rendered by CINCPAC and feel that PAMS complements CINCPAC programs such as the ANZUS Planning Seminar, The Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminar (PASOLS), and other Pacific service-sponsored activities.

My next introduction is a particular pleasure. Our guest visited WESTCOM Headquarters several months ago enroute to his new command, and we had an opportunity to discuss some of our activities and programs with him. Naturally, PAMS was a subject of discussion. When we suggested that our guest honor us by being our keynote speaker for PAMS III, by sharing his experiences as the only US Army front-line military commander in the Pacific -- and I am talking about being the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command; Commander in Chief, Republic of Korea-United States Combined Forces Command; Commander, United States Forces-Korea, and Commanding General, Eighth United States Army -- he honored us by accepting without hesitancy.

Our keynote speaker is a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, the Infantry School at Fort Benning, The Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; The Armed Forces Staff College at Norfolk Virginia, and the National War College at Washington D.C. He commanded a battalion in combat in Vietnam with the famous First Air Cavalry Division. He commanded a brigade of the "Rock of the Marne" Third Infantry Division in Europe, and he was the commanding general of the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) at Fort Campbell, Kentucky. As you might expect, he has had

key staff positions for the army and for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He has been the Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Schlesinger. He has been the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations to General Meyer who was our keynote speaker last year; and he has been the Director of the Joint Staff of the Armed Forces of the United States before assuming his current responsibilities in Korea.

In addition to his military schooling, General Wickham has two master's degrees from Harvard University; one in Public Administration and the other in Politics, Economics and Government. Our keynote speaker is a highly decorated general of the American Armed Forces. He has been awarded the Distinguished Service Medal, our country's highest award for service, three times; twice by the Department of Defense, once by the Department of the Army. I am honored as a soldier, proud as a friend, and pleased with you to have the pleasure to introduce our keynote speaker for PAMS III, General John A. Wickham, Jr.

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - III

14 January 1980

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

GENERAL JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR.

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

General John A. Wickham Jr.

General Wolff, gentlemen. I am delighted to be with you today and to contribute to the third Pacific Armies Management Seminar. As you know, when the US Army Pacific was disestablished in 1975 and until US Army Western Command was inaugurated last year, the US Army was not very visible in the Asia-Pacific region except for Korea and Japan.

The Pacific Armies Management Seminar series was undertaken as a forum for professional soldiers from all of the countries of the Asia-Pacific region to concentrate from time to time on defense planning problems and solutions which are common to all armies. The nature of defense problems and the solutions developed by defense planners, it seems to me, is a function of the type of defense envisioned. This includes the capabilities of opposing forces as well as a host of other factors and constraints such as defense industry capabilities, mutual security arrangements, national economic capabilities to sustain defense spending, resource stockpiles, national consensus on the level of defense needed and so forth. I will focus my remarks primarily on Korea and illustrations of defense planning problems and solutions. I am sure there will be similarities to situations in your areas.

The Republic of Korea faces a very formidable threat to the north. The North's capabilities are impressive. As a result of our revised intelligence estimates last year we now have a better grasp on how much the North Korean threat has continued to grow over the last decade. With approximately four thousand artillery pieces, two thousand five hundred tanks, eleven hundred aircraft and four hundred and fifty ships, they have a significant numerical advantage in many types of weapons over the combined forces which are in place defending the Republic of Korea. Except for sophisticated items such as aircraft and electronic equipment, the North Koreans can produce virtually all of their military hardware, to include tanks and artillery. They have considerable river crossing equipment and have been engaged for years in large scale operations to tunnel under the DMZ. These operations involve drilling for miles, sometimes through solid granite more than fifty meters below the ground. Tunnel number three, discovered a little over a year ago, took five years to build, which shows the scale of construction effort and sacrifice required. North Korea is a totally closed and secretive society, hence intelligence collection

is difficult for us. As a consequence, an attack could be launched with little warning.

The completed intelligence reassessment of North Korean forces indicates the North's personnel strength is about two hundred thousand greater than we had previously thought. Moreover, a surprisingly large portion of their total personnel strength is composed of unconventional warfare forces whose single purpose is to wreak havoc in the rear areas of South Korea. Rear area security thus becomes a major problem for defense planners.

We have evidence that North Korean armed forces are conducting extensive combined arms training exercises with all of their services. This contributes to an extremely high state of readiness. Also much of North Korea's defense industry and virtually all of the forward deployed aircraft and artillery are protected by caves.

The diversion of manpower and resources into the military field has strained the North Korean economy and severely impaired its trade balance. A comparison of North Korean defense spending with that of the Republic of Korea is difficult because the economies are so dissimilar. But we have reason to believe that North Korea spends at least fifteen percent of its gross national product on the military. In spite of the economic burden imposed by its extensive military build-up, we have as yet no evidence of a slow-down in the North Korean military effort. At the same time, we find that the North Koreans claim to be the only legitimate entity on the peninsula. North Korea denies the legitimacy of the Republic of Korea and refuses to deal with it. The North shows little interest in any step towards peaceful resolution of the problems which divide the peninsula and appears, in my judgment, to be aiming for domination of the Republic of Korea by any means, including military.

The total pattern of North Korean behavior -- their military preparations, their psychological warfare, their warlike talk, and their refusal to conduct world community business through the normal channels -- is not at all reassuring. We have to date little reason for confidence that North Korea would refrain from using force should it appear profitable to do so.

The Republic of Korea has a particularly unique situation in light of the threat to the north. First, occupying the southern half of the Korean peninsula, the Republic of Korea

is unusually dependent on sea and air lines of communications. Most of the equipment, ammunition, POL,¹ and other supplies required for the successful defense of the Republic would have to come in by sea. Another unique situation also exists. Seoul, capital of the Republic, is located only 26 miles from the forward edge of the threat. That is only about three air minutes in a jet fighter. Seoul is one of the fifteen largest cities of the world, nearly eight million people. Forty percent of the gross national product exists there. Twenty percent of the Republic's population circulates 70% of the nation's currency. Seoul has 25% of the nation's manufacturing, 45% of its motor vehicles, half of its 80 universities, 60% of its hospitals and most of the central government's offices.

As a consequence, the Republic must be defended as far north as possible. These unique circumstances preordain the type of defensive operations and force developments that must occur to defeat armed aggression from the north. The defensive concept is a blend of position and active defenses with which most of you are familiar. Essentially the forward defense concept involves air, ground and sea forces operating under a combined command in coordinated operations to destroy attacking forces as far forward as possible and then assume the offensive.

Extensive obstacles and barriers, including minefields, have been erected along several defensive lines south of the DMZ to delay, channelize and destroy the attacker. Seoul itself has been fortified to counter a worst case situation. Units and supporting weapons are positioned so that defense positions can be occupied quickly. The first line of defense along the DMZ is always fully manned. Resources are protected in hardened positions and arrayed in depth.

Rear area security operations involve protection of vulnerable command, control and communications facilities, ammunition and POL reserves and airfields by reserve forces. Sea forces will be employed to interdict infiltration, to reopen mined areas and destroy submarines. Air power will be committed with emphasis on gaining control of forces before they can influence the battle. Of course, close air support will be provided to the forward deployed ground units as well.

Naturally, early warning of an attack will be important to the conduct of the defense. The earlier the warning, the more extensive the obstacles we can emplace, and the sooner we can

¹ Petroleum, oil, lubricants

use substantial mobilized reserves in forward areas. Thus great emphasis is placed not only on early collection and analysis of intelligence, but also on positioning of intelligence collectors in depth so that they will not be lost in the first attacks.

It has never been the US or the ROK's intention in the Republic of Korea to match the North tank for tank, division for division, aircraft for aircraft, gun for gun. There are several reasons for this. One is that our purpose is defense. We defend--we are not postured for offensive action. And it is also because the basic assumption underlying the defense of the peninsula is complementarity of forces--the US forces in place, along with Korean forces in place, will be augmented by US forces from outside the peninsula and Korean reserve forces and mobilized assets. In my judgment, this augmentation plus the in place forces, can defeat any attack by North Korea. In short, our total combat capability has been adequate to deter aggression, and substantial improvements are being made to assure that the "Peace of the Strong" is maintained on the Korean Peninsula.

It is the mission of our combined forces in the Republic of Korea and US augmentation forces to provide the margin of strength that will leave no doubt in the minds of North Korea and those who would support them that they would have far more to lose than to gain by war. By ensuring that North Korea is not tempted by perceived weakness of our wills or our arms, and by showing that military action is not a viable option, we will help to provide the kind of environment in which political negotiations over time may have a reasonable prospect of success.

The political situation in the Republic of Korea is particularly vulnerable to influence by infiltration from the North. This adds increased emphasis to coastal surveillance and rear area security missions as part of the forward defense concept. North Korea has nearly 100,000 unconventional warfare type forces which are capable of infiltration missions to the south by air, sea or tunnel. To counter this threat and to minimize the impact to political stability during hostilities, ROK reserve forces and homeland defense forces have been given the rear area security mission. This capability is exercised annually during our joint and combined training exercises and the reserves and homeland defense forces train one day per month to retain a fine edge on their military skills.

The US mutual security arrangements with the ROK stresses complementarity in forces, combat doctrine, weapons and logistics as well as combined command, control and communications. This complementarity enhances not only the interoperability of forces and equipment but also is practiced daily in joint and combined training, to sustain the momentum for a truly combined forward defense effort. Together, in my judgment, the combined ROK and US forces are fully capable of defending the Republic of Korea north of Seoul. Without the strong US logistic support and ready augmentation forces, the Republic of Korea would be hard pressed to accomplish this very demanding and challenging mission alone. It was conceived this way to allow the Republic to develop its civilian sector while taking increased responsibility for its defense. Because of the continuing emphasis on complementarity, many of the defense planning problems associated with the conduct of a combined forward defense have been reduced in their complexity. When forces, doctrine, weapons, and ammunition, logistics and maintenance are interoperable between and among the combined forces, the whole tends to become greater than the sum of its parts. Moreover, complementarity of forces means that each ally can capitalize on its unique capabilities at a reduced overall defense burden.

The structured organization charged with the defense of the Republic of Korea is the Combined Forces Command which was inaugurated on 7 November 1978. I serve as Commander in Chief. In addition, I also serve as Commander in Chief, United Nations Command; Commander, US Forces Korea, Eighth United States Army and as the ground component commander of the CFC. That sounds like a hand full of jobs. Perhaps I should pause for a moment and define a few terms.

As Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, I am charged with maintaining the armistice that has existed since 1953. As Commander in Chief, Combined Forces Command, I have two missions: (1) provide credible deterrence to prevent any form of aggression or adventurism from outside of the Republic. (2) Should deterrence fail, the Combined Forces Command will defeat whatever form of aggression that presents itself. As Commander of CFC, I exercise operational control over all assigned forces, US and Korean, roughly 650,000 active duty military and 3.5 million reserve personnel upon mobilization. The air component commander is a US Air Force officer. The naval component commander is a Korean Admiral. In each case the deputy commander for a component comes from the other nation. Through this mechanism we have developed the first totally integrated command structure for the defense of the Republic of Korea.

Let me tell you that it works. As with any such structure, we have found problems, and we are ironing them out just as you would expect. It is already clear that we are benefiting greatly, not only from more effective command and control but also through increased exchange of technical information, development of analytic studies concerning effectiveness of various alternatives for force structure, defense positions, force improvements, and allocation of resources such as air power and artillery. In short, our cooperation has never been as good, and Korean participation in the development and execution of plans has never been as meaningful as it is at present.

My catalog of the strong points--and they're just the top of the list--would not be complete without reference to probably what is the most important ingredient of all, that is the professionalism of the Korean soldiers and officers in the ground forces, in the Air Forces, in the Navy and in the Marines. These soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines are the best ever. They are highly trained. Most commanders from battalion up have combat experience. They are probably among the best educated in the world. Less than 17% of the soldiers in the ROK army have not finished high school. Twenty three percent have college degrees. The academic credentials of the ROK Air Force and ROK Navy are higher. All enlisted men of ROK Navy and Air Force are high school graduates. Ninety-nine percent of the ROK armed forces officer corps are college graduates. They have been exposed to the latest in doctrine. They possess some of the most capable weapons in the world, and they have an enormous motivation. Their morale and physical fitness are very high, and they are prepared to do whatever is asked of them in peace or in war.

The manpower pool available to support the economic miracle that the Republic of Korea has become over the last two decades has a direct bearing on the defense of the Republic. This is a constraint to defense planners. To supply the skilled manpower required to sustain the remarkable economic growth places a ceiling on the number of personnel available at any one time for active duty in the ROK armed forces at about 600,000. With increasing equipment modernization and its corollary requirement for augmented support forces, this manpower constraint calls for relying on defense industry to provide such support as depot maintenance. The ROK has instituted universal military service for all its able-bodied young men coupled with a reserve requirement to meet the manpower needs of the armed forces in peace and war. Through this mechanism the manpower needs of

both industry and the armed forces can be met. Manpower available not only drives the size of the armed forces but also drives the rate of modernization for any developing country.

Another remarkable portion of the economic sector of the Republic of Korea is the defense industry. During the past five years, the ROK defense industry has made important progress in the direction of self-sufficiency. Korea now manufactures guns, to include machine guns, radios, tank rebuild, artillery, rocket launchers, and the munitions for them. The vast majority of military vehicles used by the Republic of Korea Army are produced there.

Improvement of the army's air mobility and anti-tank weaponry from helicopters also is of concern. Korean defense industries are producing the MD500 TOW helicopters. Sixty percent of the air frame components, incidentally, are produced in the Republic.

For the Navy, the highest priority is the continued production of high speed patrol boats. The navy's high speed patrol craft are considered among the finest of their type, but more of them are needed to counter infiltration. Work is also continuing to improve anti-submarine warfare capabilities in conjunction with US forces to counter the North Korean submarine threat. It would be well to note here that the Republic's shipbuilding industry is now one of the largest and most sophisticated in the world. It has the potential to build any type of ship that's needed, whether it's military or commercial.

What I have discussed so far with you are some of the ingredients of combined defense planning. Let me summarize some of the key factors for defense planners which the Korean situation highlights.

- Defense planners must recognize threat capabilities and national constraints such as available manpower, defense spending level, and defense industry capabilities. These factors must be taken into account in force sizing and modernization goals.

- Defense planners must take advantage of unique capabilities such as terrain and defense industrial effectiveness, and capitalize on available resources by effectiveness analysis of alternatives.

- Defense planners must maximize intelligence to gain warning, the obverse is true for communications security and cover and deception planning.

- Defense planners must develop coherent defensive concepts, echelon their resources, and prepare reserves and defensive positions in depth.

- To the extent national considerations permit, defense planners should seek complementarity of forces through mutual security arrangements, and balance the array of armed forces to national modernization goals.

We all know that the most important service a government can provide for its people is national security. There are proverbs in the free world which relate to defense preparedness. One such proverb is that the "Price of liberty is eternal vigilance." A similar proverb in the orient is that "To be prepared is to avoid misfortune." Thus the ultimate purpose of defense planning and national commitment is to develop sufficient preparedness to avoid the misfortune of war. Thank you.

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - III

14 January 1980

FEATURED ADDRESS

MAJOR GENERAL J.E.D. PERERA
COMMANDER, SRI LANKA ARMY

FEATURED ADDRESS

MAJOR GENERAL J. E. D. PERERA

General Wolff, General Tan, and Gentlemen: I must first thank General Wolff not only for the kind words he expressed a few moments ago, but also for having invited me to address this august audience. May I also congratulate General Wolff and his staff for the initiatives taken to have us attend PAMS III and for having successfully completed PAMS I and II. Unfortunately, I have to leave for my country in two days time and will not be here at the end of the session, but I am certain that with the wonderful start we had this morning from General Wickham, this session will be as successful, if not more, than those sessions held earlier.

Before I get down to the subject which I am going to speak about, I might orient you about my country. I do not want to go into the political, historical, geographical, and demographic background, but only certain aspects which I believe will help you to understand what I have to say in regard to the participation of small armies, such as ours, in the development of the developing countries. Sri Lanka, or Ceylon as it was known up to about 10 years back, has a written history of 2,500 years. During that period and up to about 200 years ago we had foreign invasions, beginning with certain South Indian states, then Arabs from the Middle East, followed by the Europeans in the 15th century--Portuguese, the Dutch, and finally the British about 200 years ago. Since then, we have been spared from this sort of agony, if I may use the word. Even the devastations of the First and Second World Wars did not affect my country. So, for the last three, four, or five generations, perhaps the people of the country were completely ignorant of foreign invasions. A military setup was not there before 1949 and we got so ignorant of what military ranks were that we had difficulty at the very beginning of convincing people of the difference between a Major General, a Major, and a Sergeant Major. We have had no defense pacts with any countries, except Britain soon after independence until we developed our own forces for internal security reasons. And, as General Wolff mentioned a short while ago, our country follows a policy of strict non-alliance. That, Gentlemen, is the background in which an Army grew up from 1949, and I was privileged in joining this Army as an officer cadet at that time and have been serving there since. And I think that I am very privileged to head that Army today.

The reasons for raising an Army, or the defense forces, were presumably the prestige required of an independent nation, the instability of the region at that time (the early 50's), the potential internal security situation as a result of independence and the problems arising thereafter,

and the realization that development could not be undertaken without stability in the country. So, in 1949, this Army of ours was raised. Since then, as I told you, we have had no external threats right up to 1979. What the next decade and thereafter has in store for us - your guess is as good as mine, but we keep our fingers crossed on that. Internally, we have had our share of problems, particularly ethnic differences bringing about communal clashes between the majority and the minorities. We have had an armed insurrection and we have also had the recurrent problems of labor strikes, problems inevitable in a developing nation. However, these internal threats have been very well controlled, so at one stage the Army seemed to be redundant (to police forces). Nevertheless, these sporadic occurrences did require the armed forces and the politicians, who have been the masters of our country ever since independence, decreed that there should be sufficient legislation to enable the armed forces to participate in national development. This is nothing new - that is, the concept of civic action by the military which I believe is found in many countries in the world. There is also the concept of peaceful uses of the military forces, PUMF, I abbreviate that. Just a word about the sister services in my country - that is, the Navy and the Air Force. They, too, participate in civic action. The Navy has the primary task of patrolling the shores of the island, but they also man ships run by the shipping corporation, thereby keeping themselves alive to their seamanship. Similarly, the Air Force runs a tourist organization using aircraft and helicopters.

In this manner, these two forces also participate in civic action movements. Now the role of the Army is specified as this chart (chart 1) will show you; the first two are normal in any Army - the third one is the maintenance of essential services at the time there is a breakdown in the normal services caused by strikes and so forth, and that is only permitted by approval of parliament, and the last is what I mentioned to you. That one is going to be the topic of my talk for the next 20 minutes or so.

The Army is organized as shown on this chart (chart 2). Basically, we have Headquarters Field Forces controlling four task forces, each consisting of an infantry battalion of regulars and two infantry battalions of volunteers; volunteers meaning part-time service to the Army, or as you call it the National Guard. We do not have conscript service in our country; everybody is a volunteer, but some do regular service while the others do part time service. We have the Volunteer Forces Headquarters controlling the administration of the volunteer units and pioneers and the national cadet corps units, which is something like your ROTC.

The other headquarters is the Support Forces which has the armour, artillery, engineers and so forth. They work together so that, at times of necessity and when conventional training goes on, armour, artillery, and engineer units are assigned to the task forces to carry out the training and their operations when required as a normal conventional force. Of course, the logistics services are to support all these operations and they are organized generally on a British pattern.

The deployment is as shown on the next map (map 2) - we have the Army spread throughout the country. We have four regions assigned - one to each task force and the metropolitan, or the Western Region, to Support Forces. This is a thickly populated area where there is a certain amount of industry. Of course, you need flexibility to move troops to areas wherever they are required, whenever the situation so demands. Well, to get on to our participation in national development. This is spearheaded by the Corps of Engineers, and the projects in which we get ourselves involved are as in this chart (chart 3). The construction of roads is important, not so much the main arterial roads, but I refer to the roads in the rural areas where communications are provided to the people of the villages by the use of machinery and manpower of the armed forces. The construction of playing fields and stadiums is also something that is carried out in the rural areas and this is very much appreciated by the rural folk. Some site clearance work is required as sites for large scale factories such as the steel factories, the textile factories, and the various other industries which have begun to function in the country. The armed forces are made responsible for the preparation of such sites with their machinery and manpower. The country has a large number of irrigation waterways which we inherited from our forefathers--thousands and thousands of what we call tanks or reservoirs, where water is collected during the monsoons and made available through irrigation channels for our agriculture purposes. The restoration of these dams is quite a formidable task and most of these tanks are located in difficult areas to which civilian agencies are reluctant to go, so inasmuch as we are as soldiers, we have to go, and we carry out this task of restoration of these irrigation works. Buildings and other constructions include our own military installations. But we've also got down to certain housing schemes, in the rural areas once again and not in the cities. We concentrate on the development of those areas. We have a large multi-purpose scheme called the Mahaveli development scheme, the Mahaveli being the largest river in the country (I've got the map of the country here) (map 3). This is the area of development of this scheme where this river is being diverted and construction of dams and various down stream measures are being planned to take place in the next six years; and we in the Army have an important part to play in the development of this scheme, which is to provide 300,000 acres of land for agricultural purposes, making us self-sufficient in food. Unfortunately, we spend a lot of

money today importing our basic needs of rice and other foodstuffs. Once this scheme is finished, our country expects to conserve a large amount of foreign exchange which is now spent on the importation of food. Here, once again, the area is undeveloped (it is mainly jungle), so the Army is called upon to clear the jungles and open up channels. There are other international agencies which have moved in there because this is beyond our capability. This is a big scheme which we hope will bear fruit in about six years time, putting us on a steady economic footing.

Now, having given you a brief outline of the type of schemes the Corps of Engineers is involved in, I want to explain to you the management procedure which we have adopted after years of experience in this area. We resorted to "ad hocism" initially, and monies routed toward the armed forces were utilized to carry out these tasks. However, we have developed, and now become accustomed to, a more streamlined system because of the great demands that have been made on the armed forces for this. And on this chart (chart 4), I have tried to show the method by which requests come from civilian agencies and from government departments and various ministries. They are all vetted by our Ministry of Defence, so there is always the political and bureaucratic examination of any scheme that is to be undertaken. Once approval is given in principle to this scheme, it comes to my headquarters where my Director of Engineering Services carries out evaluation studies and he passes it on to the operational units - that is what we call the Plant Engineer Regiment and the Construction Engineer Regiment. Once approval is given we get on with the job, and the assignment of troops is made depending on the tasks in hand, not only the national development tasks, but also depending on the other calls made on the armed forces. We have adopted what we call an advance account system by which we do not utilize the funds voted by Parliament for the customary running of the armed services for this development purpose. Parliament gives us certain financial limits within which we can operate on an advance basis for carrying out projects of this nature. The first year I was happy to note that, as a result of this, there was a "plow back" to the country's exchequer - a sum equivalent to 25% of what is spent on maintenance of the Army, so this is one way in which we earn our existence in the country. Now, having noted the tasks carried out by the Corps of Engineers, I will deal with certain miscellaneous tasks which are assigned to other units in the Army (chart 5).

We believe that every unit in the Army must participate in this national development program. Some tasks that we have undertaken are anti-illicit immigration and anti-smuggling operations. We have a large number of illicit immigrants coming into our country from South India. This became a problem to us because, as I told you earlier, we are short of food ourselves, we have a high unemployment figure, and illicit immigrants coming in at that rate throws a burden on the

exchequer. So the two ladies who headed India and Sri Lanka, Mrs. Ghandi and Mrs. Bandaranaike, got together as two leaders of two neighboring countries, and achieved something that the men who previously ruled the countries could not do. They came to an agreement that there will be a control, on both sides, of illicit immigration and there has been a reduction in this. Therefore, we have had almost 2,600 apprehended since that agreement. We deport them to India and the Indians take appropriate steps. We also assist the Customs and other agencies in the detection of smuggled goods. For about ten years there was a ban on the import of various items to our country and the controls naturally promoted smuggling. Today, there is liberalization on the import of goods and smuggling has been minimized, so at the moment we do not get ourselves involved in this operation, though we did it for a number of years.

I have put down another thing, The National Development Service Training. We do not have compulsory military service, nor do we have national service, but there are a large number of skilled youths who are unemployed and they are harnessed into groups which could be used in irrigation work, building work, and similar development projects. To get them to go to work together, to get them disciplined and to get them to live together requires a certain amount of basic training. The Army was assigned the task of training these youngsters, both boys and girls, for a period of six weeks in basic discipline and management techniques before they go out in the field. They have been doing very well. This, in fact, was based on the conservation program (Civilian Conservation Corps) which I believe took place in the United States sometime in the 1930's when GEN MacArthur was Chief of Army Staff. We started last year and it is working very successfully. I do hope we will have some beneficial results in consequence of this.


In the sphere of agriculture we do not employ regular troops but we do employ pioneers (volunteers) who supervise local labor, and my aim is to make the Army's production improve. So far we have had 25% of our own food being produced by ourselves and I hope that in the next few years that we will be 100% self-sufficient in our own production of food which will help reduce the burden on the exchequer. Here is something new which we started two years ago - the provision of a national transport pool. Actually it is what we call the "third line" of transport, heavy vehicles, which are operated by Army personnel. Here again, due to the lack of operational commitments, most of these vehicles remain unused except during training periods and operational periods. So, we devised a means of renting out vehicles to other government departments and corporations. We operate the system and it has been working rather successfully, and thereby we earn sufficient money to keep our fleets replenished as the need arises.

The next task we've planned - which is carried out by most armies, as evident only a few days ago in this state, in Hawaii - is disaster relief operations. This comes up periodically, as being a tropical country, we are subject to the monsoons, to floods, and these are the activities we carry out during such periods. I won't go through the list (chart 6) which is familiar to most of you. In November, 1978 probably some of you have heard of the disastrous cyclone that struck the eastern coast of Sri Lanka, the center of which was in a place called Batticaloa. It struck right across the red portion of the map (show map 2), the north central region, and the major damage caused by that cyclone was in this region: 95,000 houses were completely destroyed, 145,000 houses were partially damaged, and 945 people were killed. Two million coconut trees were destroyed and, as you know, coconut is one of our major exports. It takes seven years to get coconuts to reproduce. Two thousand square miles of teak forest were destroyed and teak is an expensive commodity since it takes 20 or 25 years to mature teak. The damage was tremendous. In addition to the destruction of various public utilities - the roads, the railways, the telephones, the electricity - everything else was damaged. It was an awful cyclone, raging at 125 miles an hour. The estimated damage is over \$100 million dollars. We have received aid and we ourselves are trying to raise the funds. A certain amount of restoration work has gone on, but the devastation that was brought about certainly has put our program of national development back.


Now, Gentlemen, that was a quick run through of our participation in national development. Before I conclude I would like to bring out certain lessons which we have learned by the use of armed forces in this sort of operations. (Chart 7). There is a risk of long involvements causing reduction in military efficiency and morale. But we have countered this by employing soldiers in this work for only short periods, usually three months at a time. They do three months of national development work, three months of training in internal security operations, three months of training in conventional operations, and then the administrative requirements, another three months. That problem has been successfully countered by rostering the troops. The risk of undermining civilian agencies, as I told you earlier, is countered by getting approval (political and bureaucratic) before we accept a scheme. There is reluctance on the part of civilian agencies to go into remote parts where there is no infrastructure such as hospitals and schools, so there really isn't much complaint from them now. Then, of course, there is the inevitable risk of corruption when you get involved in contracts and so forth. Here again, we countered it by getting ministerial approval, and boards are appointed for the examination of contractual documents that are required for such work. Usually these contracts are government

department to department, so there is no risk. And the final point that is often made is that there is familiarity of soldiers with civilians which makes soldiers less effective in internal security operations. Too much of this "familiarity" isn't very good, but there again, we found through experience that by good training and discipline and constant changeovers, we have prevented the familiarity from rising to a problem level. On the contrary, we have won the respect of the people and that of the nation. As I told you, 30 years ago the country was completely ignorant of armed forces. Now, there is tremendous appreciation by the people for the armed forces, not only for the security situation that prevails in the country, but the contribution they make in national development. I wish to emphasize the point which GEN Wickham made this morning that we do not interfere in the politics of the country. The armed forces have been apolitical from the start and we have democracy prevailing in the independent nation of Sri Lanka, where we have a two-party system. We have one party in for five years, the people seem to tire of them so they are voted out, and the other party comes in. And this "see-saw" business has been going on for the last thirty years without any interruption from the armed forces. Having said that I would like to show you a short film of about eight minutes duration to illustrate what I have been trying to explain of the work undertaken by the armed forces of our country. Should you want to ask any questions from me at the end, you may do so.


THE SRI LANKA ARMY'S PARTICIPATION IN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT



GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS OF RESPONSIBILITY
OF FORMATIONS



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LIST OF CHARTS: MG PERERA'S ADDRESS


CHART 1

ROLE OF THE SRI LANKA ARMY

1. The defence of Sri Lanka against an external or internal threat.
2. Maintenance of law and order in aid of the civil authorities.
3. Maintenance of essential services when ordered to do so by the government.
4. Participating in national development projects.

CHART 2

ORGANIZATION OF THE SRI LANKA ARMY



NOTES: R= regular, V= volunteer

1. Tng Ctr, Commando Sqn (R), Corps of Sigs (R+V), MP Corps (R), Plant Engr Regt (V), Works Engr Regt (R), Const Engr Regt (V), Med Corps Units (1R, 1V), Women's Corps (R), Natl Tpt Unit (V)

2. 1 regular, 1 volunteer

CHART 3

NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT TASKS-CORPS OF ENGINEERS

1. Construction of roads.
2. Construction of playing fields & stadiums.
3. Site clearance work.
4. Restoration of irrigation works.
5. Buildings and construction.
6. Earthworks and jungle clearing for Mahaweli River Diversion Project.

MANAGEMENT OF PROJECTS




CHART 5

MISCELLANEOUS TASKS

1. Anti illicit immigration and anti smuggling duties
 - a. Number of illicit immigrants apprehended: 2,653
 - b. Value of smuggled goods detected: Rs.11,576,240.05
2. National development service training.
3. Agriculture
4. National transport unit.

CHART 6

ARMY ASSISTANCE IN DISASTER RELIEF OPERATIONS

1. Evacuation of personnel from affected areas.
2. Establishing radio communications.
3. Establishing medical units for first aid inclusive of evacuation of casualties.
4. Providing security to affected areas.
5. Re-establishing of electrical power supply.
6. Maintenance of highways, providing alternative routes to affected areas, construction of bridges, clearing of earth slips so that the communication network is restored. This includes the railways.
7. Establishing of refugee camps.
8. Distribution of food and maintaining food stocks.
9. Maintaining a transport pool.
10. Reconstruction of damaged public buildings i.e., amenities such as hospitals etc.
11. Providing security in aid to civil authority.

CHART 7

CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS

1. Risk of long involvement causing reduction in military efficiency and of morale. Countered by rostering of troops.
2. Risk of undermining civilian agencies. Countered by political approval from ministry. Also civilians dislike working in difficult areas lacking in infrastructure.
3. Risk of corruption. Countered by contracts being usually department to department basis. Where civil requirements arise special boards are appointed to examine contracts thereby minimizing possibility of corruption.
4. Familiarity with civilians makes soldier less effective in internal security operations. This is possible, but experience has shown greater admiration and respect due to good discipline, training, and leadership.

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - III

18 January 1980

SPECIAL GUEST SPEAKER

ADMIRAL ROBERT L.J. LONG
COMMANDER IN CHIEF
UNITED STATES PACIFIC COMMAND

NARRATIVE OF CINCPAC ADDRESS

Admiral Robert L.J. Long

I am especially honored and privileged to have the opportunity to address PAMS III. Collectively you are an impressive sight to behold ... professional army officers in your distinctive uniforms proudly representing your individual countries in the spirit of mutual trust and cooperation. I want to emphasize at this point that although I wear a navy uniform, the CINCPAC is a unified commander deeply involved with the operational and planning aspects of all U.S. forces in the Pacific Command. I do understand and appreciate the fact that in most of your countries the largest share of the burden of national defense and security falls primarily upon army forces.

As I see it, the organization, training, and support of those forces poses many management problems ... especially difficult resource management problems for which practical solutions must be found. More often than not, such solutions have broad applications ... they are common answers to mutual problems. Of course, that is why you are here at PAMS III generating practical solutions thru your superb cooperative efforts to some very difficult management problems. I applaud your mutual efforts and successes, knowing that when you return home and apply those solutions, concepts, and ideas you will improve your forces' operational capabilities and readiness. I can think of no higher priority than improving operational capabilities and readiness posture.

I want to contribute to PAMS III by providing you with some CINCPAC perspectives relating to the strategic situation in Asia, the Pacific, and Indian Ocean regions. The strategic situation is marked with considerable change since PAMS II in April 1979.

First I'll point to the economic situation. Center stage for world trade is no longer found by looking to Europe. 1979 confirmed the trend. The United States is conducting more two-way trade with Asia-Pacific nations than with all of Europe ... over 80 billion dollars in 1979. Japan, with its expanding gross national product of nearly one trillion dollars, has become the leading trading partner of the U.S. overseas. The Republic of Korea's double digit annual economic growth record is impressive. ASEAN, now 12 years old, conducted 14 billion dollars of trade with the U.S. in 1979, while Taiwan alone can boast of 7.5 billion dollars of 1979 trade with

the U.S. No where else on the globe offers greater hope for the mutual prosperity of nations in the decade of the 80's than I see when I survey the one hundred million square miles of the Pacific Command. However, my optimism is guarded by the realization that today we have more reasons for concern about the future peacefulness of the Asia-Pacific-Indian Ocean environment than we had just a few months ago.

Consider Northeast Asia. While Japan remains constitutionally restricted to homeland defense she has become more concerned about Soviet military expansion and adventurism in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean. Japan's lifelines are vulnerable to interdiction. Meanwhile, the steady expansion of Soviet troops occupying historically claimed Japanese islands near Hokkaido adds more reason for Japanese concern about the military intent of the Soviet Union in the decade of the 1980's. The Japanese defense budget now stands at about .9 percent of gross national product, while Japanese-U.S. military cooperation continues to be excellent.

On the nearby Korean Peninsula the situation remains volatile. Though the Republic of Korea maintains an economic growth edge over the North going into the 1980's, we must understand that North Korea continues its offensive force buildup, with about 75 percent of its ground forces deployed offensively near the demilitarized zone. The magnitude of this threat now requires the Republic of Korea to allocate about 34 percent of their annual budget to defense. The United States is committed to a sovereign and free Republic of Korea. As a nation we will take whatever action is necessary to help in their defense.

Our security commitment to Japan and the Republic of Korea underscores U.S. interests in Northeast Asia. The United States also maintains defense treaties and agreements with the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand and Pakistan. I regard these as commitments that the U.S. fully intends to honor. Militarily, the Pacific Command stands prepared to do so, when directed by our national command authority.

Forward bases play a key role in our deterrent posture, especially those we use in the Philippines that are astride important lines of commerce. I would emphasize the mutual importance of these bases to our allies, firends, and to the U.S.; not only for support of contingencies including operations in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean, but also for the conduct of essential joint training exercises.

In Southeast Asia peace is not eminent. The Vietnamese, now linked by defense treaty and support indebtedness to Russia, have become the dominant force in Laos and Kampuchea. This clearly represents a potential danger or threat to the security of Thailand, a U.S. treaty ally. The United States shall continue to afford Thailand essential support to cope with the threat she now faces.

We also consider Micronesia and the South Pacific Island area of strategic importance. Many newly independent and emerging nations there are seeking development assistance while striving to enhance their economies and environment. Any successful establishment of a Soviet power base in the area would be counter to peaceful interests.

In the Indian Ocean the free transit of oil is vital to world economics ... 16 percent of U.S. oil needs, 60 percent of western Europe's, and 75 percent of Japan's. There has been either direct or sponsored Soviet adventurism in nearby Angola, Somalia, Ethiopia, North and South Yemen and Vietnam, followed by the outright Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Peaceful interests of nations are being increasingly threatened by the Soviet Union in this vital region; and I am especially emphasizing the threat that I perceive to non-aligned and developing nations of the region in light of recent events in Afghanistan.

In sum, Russia has acquired an increased capability in the Western Pacific and Indian Ocean to interdict vital oil sea lanes; to influence control and free passage through straits and choke points; and to exert pressure, including military intimidation, upon developing and non-aligned nations of the regions. There are some 36,000 Soviet-sponsored Cuban surrogate troops on the African sub-continent and in South Yemen that could be employed in expanded roles in other nations.

As for the probability of conflicts, in my opinion, nuclear warfare is remote. However, it is essential that the United States continue to maintain nuclear parity with the Soviet Union through improvements in the balance of our strategic nuclear forces. This parity must also be widely perceived.

A general war with the Soviet Union is not likely, but it cannot be ruled out. The prospects for such a major conflict can no longer be viewed in NATO-Warsaw Pact isolation. Recent events in Afghanistan demonstrate that Russia will not hesitate to use force to achieve their objectives. I believe

the key to deterring general war in the Pacific theater is conventional force levels. We must reverse the trends vis-a-vis Soviet Far East and Pacific conventional force levels.

Given the prevailing strategic factors, other conflict scenarios appear much more likely. In the decade of the 1980's I see the United States, our allies, and friends, being tested by crises, contingencies, terrorism, and a variety of radical actions, some of which could be fostered by the Soviet Union and their proxies. U.S. Pacific Command deterrence must continue with the forward basing of forces and capability to rapidly respond in our national interests when so directed by our national command authority. The commitment of non-aligned nations, friends and allies is essential. In my opinion, a balanced global perspective shows that the Pacific and Indian Oceans could be the most likely areas where such tests of our resolve and readiness will occur in the 1980's.

Perhaps some insight concerning what I regard as important considerations in Pacific Command force planning, operations and commitment would be helpful. We must employ our forces in a flexible manner. The fact that the aircraft carrier "Nimitz" recently rounded the Cape of Good Hope and entered the Pacific Command area for operations in the Indian Ocean is most illustrative of this point. Second, the nature and extent of the threat must be recognized; not only by the United States, but by our friends and allies. Finally, when considering that the United States is a super-power capable of extensive military efforts and power projection, we must recognize that money by itself cannot cause us to prevail without the support of our allies and friends.

Once again, I want to commend you for your participation in the third Pacific Armies Management Seminar.

PANEL ASSIGNMENTS

PACIFIC ARMIES MANGEMENT SEMINAR - III

14-18 January 1980

PANEL 1

*Col THAWAN Sawaengpan
Col H.K. OYAMA
Col SIRAJUL Haque
Lt Col Gerard LAGANE
Lt Col Maniur PASARIBU
Lt Col HEW King Thiam
Lt Col Evan J. TORRANCE
Lt Col A.R. HUAI
Lt Col Herbert G. THOMS
Maj Stephen J. PAEK
Maj LEE Sang Sun
Cpt George YEO
**Lt Col Ronald D. TURNER

PANEL II

*Col NANA Narundana
Col PRAMON Palasin
Col Dalmacio G. PIZANA, Jr.
Lt Col(P) YIM Chong Soon
Lt Col Mohammed ARIFF bin Ali
Lt Col Lindsay G. WILLIAMS
Lt Col Lima DOTAONA
Lt Col Donnie D. PEARCE
Maj CHEN Chin Chi
Maj Gaylen NARIMATSU
Maj Anthony H. NORMAND
Sub Lt H.R.H. A.F. MA'ATU
**Lt Col Karl P. PIOTROWSKI

PANEL 3

*Col Felix A. BRAUNER, Jr.
Col SUNG Yun Young
Col John F. BEHNEMAN
Col CHOOCHART Hiranraks
Lt Col Herman B.L. ANTIRI
Lt Col Mohammad Abqus SALAM
Lt Col Bruce G. JENKIN
Lt Col Virgilio M. DAVID
Lt Col Joe S. FALKNER, Jr.
Lt Col Glenn D. HOLLIS
Mr. Myron H. BOLOTIN
Maj Mitsuru KUSHIYA
**Maj(P) Robert K. TYSON

ROVING PANEL MEMBERS

Lt Col(P) John G. GERGULIS
Lt Col(P) George W. TATE
Lt Col Norman L. CUSTARD
Lt Col Peter A. KIND
Lt Col Curtis J. HERRICK
Maj Robert B. KILLEBREW

* Chairman
** Recorder

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - III

PANEL DISCUSSION TOPICS AND REPORTS

TUESDAY - 15 January 1980

"Operations Planning"

PANEL #1

DISCUSSION TOPICS: 15 January 1980

1. Role and Purpose of Planning and Plans
2. Resource Constraints in the Planning Process
3. Considerations of Alternatives/Courses of Action

Role and Purpose of Planning and Plans: There are basically two types of plans: operational plans that are detailed, actual mission plans to be executed; and contingency plans which are hypothetical, and by their nature must be flexible. Contingency plans may not be executed in their original form, but must be adjusted to the actual situation if they do in fact become operational plans. Planning allows us to identify a design or scheme of action to accomplish an objective. It provides guidance to all units, and identifies the tasks. In addition, planning provides a sequence to integrate the actions of multiple agencies or units, as well as a focal point for coordinating all necessary actions.

Contingency planning allows for a quick response when a situation occurs. It is something you can turn to immediately to finalize coordination among agencies. It is a fact that time spent planning is never considered wasted time.

When planning you must consider all the details, but allow a certain degree of flexibility. A contingency plan is in fact a guide for the manager to use to convene operational planning.

Some military force levels and force structures are based upon possible contingency plans. Many small nations do not face the same type or number of contingencies that may confront a larger nation. Military needs are always uncertain. Unless planning is accomplished a force will not be flexible enough to meet immediate situations and requirements.

There are many benefits to detailed planning. A plan can provide a data base of necessary information as well as a guide for action. For commanders it provides a vehicle for training troops. The plan can be a sequential thought process whereby we prepare, equip, and train a force for a task.

A contingency plan provides for a quick response to accomplish a desired objective, especially where the only variable is time. In addition, a detailed plan can prevent making mistakes over and over again.

In considering the planning process, plans must be dynamic and not inhibit creative thinking on the part of staff. There may be a law of diminishing returns that dictates that we not expend valuable resources for plans which will never happen. Plans should not be allowed to create a false sense of security in any army.

Plans are necessary and have many advantages. Contingency plans have limits. We should not overplan. There is a constant need to improve plans. But in the final analysis we should not depend on contingency plans. They must be flexible. All armies should remain open to new ideas when revising plans.

Resource Constraints in the Planning Process: The first task is to identify what resources limit our options. When preparing any plan, the objective will determine the required resources. We should know the enemy's strength and weaknesses and structure our forces to counter his strengths and take advantage of his weaknesses. A shortage of resources will limit options. In addition, there may be a time lag between the procurement of the resources, and the training of the men to use them. Plans must change to meet the availability of new equipment and trained manpower.

Constraints which limit our options are time, political considerations, international and regional relations, environment and resources such as funds, manpower, equipment and technology. Limited resources require us to put emphasis on just when and where we use those available assets.

Some nations must overcome environmental constraints, others political constraints. One solution to limited resources is standardization and interoperability between nations. This allows one nation to provide some resources, while another provides a complementary resource. Trade-offs between national armies are difficult to understand or accomplish without a mutual treaty structure as the catalyst for action.

We must be aware of our constraints, and those of our enemy; and adopt a feasible course of action which employs our strengths against his weaknesses.

Consideration of Alternatives/Course of Action: Armies must be prepared to make "trade-offs" and overcome shortfalls in considering alternatives. In preparing plans a proper mix of transportation, troops, material and other resources must be programmed. In the final plan any course of action is governed by resources available. See slides 3, 4, and 5.

SLIDE #1

Plans

- Operational Plans (Actual Mission) Detailed
- Contingency Plans (Hypothetical) Flexible

Role

- To identify a design or scheme of action to accomplish an objective

Purpose

- Provide Guidance to all soldiers
- Provide sequence to integrate action
- Identify tasks
- Provide common focal point to coordinate action
- Provide a means to assess what has been done and what remains to be done

Expected Benefits of detailed plan

- Detailed data base
- Guidance
- Vehicle to train troops
 - Prepare
 - Inform
 - Equip
- Sequential thought process
- Provides for quick response
- Prevent making same mistake twice

Some Considerations of Planning

- Plans must be dynamic
- Order is required to execute a plan
 - Chance to update

Areas of Concern (Contingency Plans)

- May inhibit creative thinking
- May expend too many resources on plans which never happen
 - (Diminishing returns)
- False sense of security

SLIDE #2

Constraints which limit options

- Limited Resources
 - Funds
 - Manpower
 - Technology
 - Equipment
- Time
- Political
- Intercountry Relations
- Environmental (Training)
- Interoperability/Compatability



Above limit alternative courses of action

Must be aware of enemy constraints and adopt a feasible course of action which employs our strength against his weakness.

SLIDE #3

Considerations of Alternatives/Courses of Action

- Discuss Tradeoffs
 - Transportation
 - Troops/Material
 - How to overcome shortfall
- Discuss Relationship Between....
 - Courses of action
 - Resources
 - Plans
 - Operations



PANEL II

Discussion Topics: 15 January 1980

1. Management Philosophy for Planning
2. Command/Staff Planning Guidance
3. Planning Pitfalls

Management Philosophy for Planning: After a brief summary of each panel member's background and military qualifications, Panel II launched into frank and thought provoking discussions. Numerous actual examples were offered by panel members to illustrate their ideas. The discussions were highly interesting and provided a variety of diverse and stimulating opinions on each topic.

On the topic of management philosophy, the panel discussed the need for flexibility in plans and the need to give subordinate commanders sufficient latitude to execute a plan. The commander on the ground usually has the best understanding of the local situation and should be given sufficient flexibility so as not to stifle his initiative. The panel agreed that superiors should not inhibit development of junior leaders by tying their hands and giving them insufficient latitude to try their ideas. The key to successful execution of plans by subordinates is a clear, understandable statement of the mission. Use of broad, mission type orders permits subordinates the flexibility to execute plans vigorously within the broad constraints of the commander's guidance. Panel members agreed that a good plan depends upon a clear understanding of the capabilities and limitations of all elements involved in planning or executing plans.

The type of mission dictates the degree of flexibility permitted in the planning and execution process. Special missions of a sensitive nature may require a detailed plan with little flexibility left to subordinates while general missions with few political or economic restraints may allow subordinates more flexibility. Higher-level units should strive to give broad general planning guidance and leave the detail planning to the lower echelons. The panel noted that it is important to guard against excessive flexibility in planning to prevent dissipation of resources and excessive competition for resources among subordinate commanders. The degree of coordination required between subordinate elements also govern the amount of flexibility a subordinate unit is permitted in a higher headquarters plan. See Slide 1 for additional details.

Command/Staff Planning Guidance: As a point of departure, the panel noted that it is important that the commander's guidance be stated in terms that allow the subordinate commander to choose one of several courses of action in executing the plan and allow subordinates the flexibility necessary to exercise initiative and command prerogatives. The panel members agreed that a higher headquarters desirably should allow the executing unit at least two-thirds of the available planning time to formulate its plans. Unfortunately, the panel noted that in practice the reverse is often true, which gives the operational unit or subordinate planners insufficient time to prepare their plans. A solution to this problem is to alert subordinate units with early warning orders and pass information piecemeal as it becomes available to assist in formulating their implementing plans. See Slide 2 for additional details.

Planning Pitfalls: This topic generated a vigorous discussion, punctuated by panel members offering frequent examples of lessons they have learned through personal experience. The need for more time and more information was the most common problem identified. "Look before you leap" was cited as still being the best advice. Parochialism is an ever present danger. The panel decided that obviously one cannot expect the official or the organization that conceived the idea or created the system to carefully examine it for faults. Effective communications was seen as the key to effective human relationships. Panel members noted that one of our missions at PAMS was to improve communications between our nation-states and unanimously agreed that the day's discussions had achieved that goal. See Slide 3 for complete listing of planning pitfalls identified.

PANEL II

Slides

SLIDE 1

Management Philosophy for Planning

- Too many restrictions stifle initiative
- Main constraints to consider
 - Time available
 - Space available
 - Resources available

SLIDE 1 (Con't)

- A clear mission statement is essential
- Mission (general) type orders are best
- Allow subordinate levels maximum flexibility possible consistent with type of mission
- Lack of flexibility inhibits leadership development
- Excessive flexibility can lead to waste of resources
- Need to insure all subordinate units move in unison restricts flexibility of plan
- Always consider capabilities of subordinate commands
- The level of unit doing the planning determines the degree of detail of plan

SLIDE 2

Command/Staff Planning Guidance

- Higher headquarters should use no more than 1/3 of available time to formulate their plan
- Pass planning information to subordinates as soon as you receive it to allow concurrent planning
- Use warning orders with fragmentary guidance to alert subordinates to initiate their planning sequence
- Know subordinates capabilities before issuing guidance
- Guidance must be clear and simple
- Guidance should offer alternatives so as to give subordinates maximum possible flexibility
- Give subordinates sufficient support and resources to comply with guidance
- Key elements of guidance
 - What, When, Where

SLIDE 2 (Con't)

- Space constraints
- Known facts about enemy/situation
- Assumptions to use about enemy situation
- How your mission fits into larger overall plan
- Administrative/support restrictions

SLIDE 3

Planning Pitfalls

- Lack of time and information
- Insufficient thought about problem formulation prior to beginning to plan
- Unwillingness to discard preconceived ideas in the face of new facts
- Parochialism
- Lack of effective communications within and between headquarters
- Assuming away the problem
- Lack of sufficiently broad analysis of situation
- Lack of or insufficiency of contingency plans
- Changing assumptions after plan is finalized
- Unwarranted assumptions not supported by known facts
- Insufficient consideration of actual situation at lower echelons
- Overly detailed plan

PANEL III

DISCUSSION TOPICS: 15 January 1980

1. Staff Organization for Planning
2. Transition from Planning to Implementation
Phases in the Operational Process
3. Assessment of Plans and Orders

Staff Organization for Planning: The panel began its discussion on the first topic by defining the term "staff organization." The discussion that ensued was both lengthy and informative. Terms that were previously thought to be commonly used to describe a particular staff function or arrangement were not understood by all country representatives to have the same meaning. In fact, the panel found that even countries that model their staff organization after the United States Army staff do not always use the same term or numerical designation for the same function. In the discussion process, panel members developed a basic understanding and appreciation of the various staff functions and organizations used by the participants. In spite of the differences, panel members found that the role and functions of a staff are generally the same in all armies although the actual organization or specific function assigned to specific staff sections may vary.

The majority of the panel's discussion time was spent on the three types of organizations for planning: permanent staff, ad hoc committee and standing committee(s). The panel identified several factors that impact on the choice of which of these staff-committee organizations is the best for a particular planning activity. Important factors and considerations identified by the panel are shown on slide one. Panel members concluded that if information is readily available, an ad hoc committee may be the best organization. In an organization with an extremely large staff, a specially formed ad-hoc committee formed for a specific task may facilitate coordination and expedite the planning process. In organizations below division level, the permanent staff is the best organization to accomplish all staff actions. In those cases where a plan deals with a narrow subject area, the committee is the preferred option since the experts can be readily assembled in one place and accomplish their task quickly. If the area is broad, and requires personnel with experience in different areas,

the permanent staff is probably the best solution. The panel also discussed the type of facilities that are available to physically hold a staff organization. If facilities are limited, the panel felt that a committee should be used to do the detailed work especially where the permanent staff is located at several different locations. The panel agreed that if a staff has many diverse activities in progress, a method of solving a particular problem may be to isolate a few key staff officers in a committee arrangement removed from routine daily activities. Standing committees have the advantage of being able to develop expertise in a particular area or specialty which is not often found in other arrangements. The ad hoc committee, being a loosely organized organization, does not generally work as efficiently as a permanent staff. The lack of formal organization frequently causes the committee problems in controlling the committee personnel which can affect group efficiency. Inadequate planning time causes problems for all types of planning staffs or organizations. A small planning committee or planning cell is probably the best organization when time is critical. If time is not a constraint, then the permanent staff can most likely do the best job.

CONCLUSIONS. The permanently organized staff is the best organization to perform most planning staff actions. Committees should be formed only to address unique staff and planning actions.

Due to the amount of time spent discussing topic one, panel III did not discuss the other two topics.

PANEL III SLIDE

Factors Impacting on Staff Organizations

- Availability of information
- Size of unit
- Type of planning
- Type of facilities
- On-going activities
- Expertise
- Control of personnel
- Availability

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - III

PANEL DISCUSSION TOPICS AND REPORTS

WEDNESDAY - 16 January 1980

"Operations Management"

PANEL I

Discussion Topics: 16 January 1980

1. Planning, Training and Operations Relationship
2. Command Post Exercises (CPX), Field Training Exercises (FTX), and Map Exercises (MAPEX)
3. Developing Realistic Training/Operations Objectives and Guidance

Planning, Training and Operations Relationship: There is a close relationship among plans, training and operations. Once a plan is developed, then training to execute the plan is undertaken. Training experience leads to confirmation or adjustment of the plan. Operations, once conducted can result in subsequent or related plans being confirmed or modified. In addition, operational experience leads to additional or modified training programs. Throughout the relationship there needs to be flexibility for adjustments, changes or improvements. Training, to be an effective tool for confirming plans, must be realistic. Emphasis must be placed on basic skills.

Armies missions are to wage war to defend the nation. We must train our armies to achieve this mission. For each nation the situation and the threat is different. Consequently appropriate plans must be made to meet each critical situation. These plans provide commanders the goals and objectives, or targets. Rehearsing plans, or in fact, training for your plans, helps you critique and judge their viability. Such a systemic approach gives the entire operation a better chance of success.

Training is the upgrading and development of human resources. Our soldiers must be trained to operate even the most sophisticated of our equipment. It was pointed out that a soldier who is a good marksman, aggressive, instilled with initiative, and well-trained can be placed in any situation, anywhere and do a good job. Good training is essential to any plan or operation.

Training does affect our plans. The very execution of the plan depends on the training of the soldier/units. A plan is only as good as the troops executing it. An army trained to its fullest degree will enhance success of plans and operations.

Command Post Exercise (CPX), Field Training Exercise (FTX), and Map Exercise (MAPEX): Exercises such as CPX, FTX, and MAPEX's provide a vehicle to train for our plans. The conduct of exercises are derived from objectives from one or a combination of the following: directives and objectives sent down by higher headquarters; the Division, Brigade or Battalion Commander; or other Commander, after consulting with his subordinates. The objectives of exercises are specified and given as tasks, conditions or standards. Exercises should be used to train units for supporting actual plans. Most delegates agree that goals and objectives must be articulated and passed from the highest level of command.

CPS's are good for training headquarters elements, staffs, developing operational and logistic procedures, and improving communications. The soldiers' time is not wasted. FTX's should follow from CPX's. An FTX is the only real way to challenge the logistic staff and other support agencies. FTX should be two-sided war games. All exercises are best executed over real terrain, and in realtime. In addition, all exercises should be as realistic as possible. The FTX is the most realistic exercise, but is the least cost-effective.

Developing Realistic Training/Operations Objectives and Guidance: Tasks, conditions, and standards must be set by Higher Headquarters. Minimum standards should be set. Anything is better than nothing. Commanders at each level must know at least what is expected of his unit as a minimum. There are basically three parts to developing training objectives: the soldier's basic skill level, past exercise training results, and the commander's assessment of his unit training level or capabilities.

There is a tendency for most armies to try to do too much. Try to set reasonable, attainable objectives, and train to achieve them. Only then can you move to the next higher set of objectives, and a higher state of training and readiness.

PANEL II

Discussion Topics: 16 January 1980

1. Role of Doctrine in Training and Operations Management
2. Operations Command and Control Methods
3. Post Operations Reviews

Role of Doctrine in Training and Operations Management: Continuing its open and professional exchanges of the first day, Panel II examined in detail its three discussion topics. Discussions were very stimulating, elicited a vigorous exchange of ideas and resulted in the development of a full range of alternatives on each topic.

Doctrine is an important part of the planning process. Good, sound doctrine can be of great assistance in shortening and simplifying the planning process as well as insuring smooth, well coordinated operations. As professional soldiers, panel members readily agreed that doctrine is of great value in reducing confusion during joint operations. Many examples were cited to illustrate this point. Panel members freely shared their good and bad experiences in their attempts to develop and implement standard procedures and doctrine. The panel decided that a written Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), based on common doctrine, was an excellent means to use in managing operations. In combined operations with several nations involved the need for all the armies employed to use the same doctrine was seen as obvious. Without common doctrine the chance for victory is greatly reduced. See Slide 1 for key points on the role of doctrine in training and operations management.

Operations Command and Control Methods: Panel II's ideas on effective command and control were extremely thought provoking. Effective command and control is extremely difficult to achieve. The commander has various methods he can use to control operations, but a good staff, closely following up on the commander's orders is the key means. Good doctrine and SOP's that are closely followed in training were also cited as valuable tools and reduce the need for control during operations. However, there is no substitute for personal visits to the operational area by the commander. Consideration must be given to the level of training of the operational unit when deciding how much control is needed. The panel then discussed at length the problem of over control.

Panel members cited examples where they felt their higher headquarters had over-controlled an operation in which they had been in charge.

The ways and means to gauge the required degree of control varied widely among the Asia-Pacific Armies represented, but all panel members agreed that over-control was a constant danger to well executed operations. See slide 2 for a complete list of operations command and control methods developed during the discussion.

Post Operations Reviews: A good hard look at an operation after it concludes is the best method to prevent repeating mistakes. Many different ways to conduct critiques were discussed. No matter how an operation is reviewed, it is important that the lessons learned from post-operations reviews are widely distributed and used in future plans and operations. The panel members agreed that to fail to learn from our mistakes is to invite disaster and will surely lead to defeat. The panel decided that it is only through constant improvement in our methods and doctrine, always striving for perfection, that we can insure success and a final victory. See slide 3 for key points on post-operations reviews.

PANEL II SLIDES

SLIDE 1

Role of Doctrine in Training and Operations Management

- Insures a coordinated effort
- Promotes standardization
- Reduces planning variables
- Saves time during planning process
- Facilitates communications
- Highlights common training goals
- Delineates areas of responsibility
- Forms basis of SOP's
- Promotes standard terminology
- Determines general allocation of resources
- Especially important in joint and combined operations methods
- Doctrine must be dynamic, not dogmatic

SLIDE 2

Operations Command and Control Methods

- Oral operations instructions
- Written operations orders
- Conducting operation in phases
- Use of milestones
- Prioritizing allocation of supplies and use of lines of communications
- Regular briefs and meetings
- Standard training following SOPS
- Visits by the Commander
- Staff visits

SLIDE 2 continued

- Staff liaison
- Staff supervision
- Central control and dissemination of information
- Rapid and effective communications means are essential
- Do not over control

SLIDE 3

Post Operations Reviews

- Immediate critique for on-the-spot corrections
- Detailed staff review followed by comprehensive after action report
- Identify planning shortfalls and areas needing further training emphasis
- Insure broad dissemination of lessons learned as feedback device
- Use review results to modify and improve doctrine and SOPs
- Follow up on corrective actions taken by staff visits and inspections
- Use review results to set test objectives for future exercises
- Be severe in review and always strive toward perfection

PANEL III

Discussion Topics: 26 Jan 80

1. Force Structure/Tailoring
2. Near-Term versus Long-Term plans and Operations
3. Operations Management Principles

Force Structure/Tailoring: Panel discussion of the first topic centered on the critical factors that influence structuring and "tailoring." These critical factors were identified as the threat, country resources and national interest (slide one). The panel's definition of force structuring was actions taken to build or design a new force while tailoring was agreed to be the action taken to modify a force already in existence. The consideration of the threat is the critical factor because analysis of the enemy is the first step in the force structuring process. The term enemy was used to denote both weather and terrain as well as the threat force. The size of the enemy force obviously has a direct bearing on the size of the friendly force that will be needed to counter the threat. The willingness of an adversary to use the force, as well as the availability of a catalyst to create the environment for taking overt action, were also considered important. Country resources needed to create the counter-force and sustain this force were the main elements discussed under the second factor. Items such as national manufacturing capabilities, the availability of raw materials, manpower and the apparatus to raise the force were the specific items discussed.

National interest was discussed from the point of view of a country's expansionist tendencies. The panel felt that a country which intended to rule by force and acquire other land areas by conflict would also tend to have a larger standing force than that ordinarily required for national defense. A number of influencing, but not critical factors, are listed on slide two. The combination of all of these factors listed were considered to be the major influencing items in making force structure and tailoring decisions.

Near-Term Versus Long-Term Plans and Operations: The discussion of this topic was limited to the advantages and disadvantages of long-term planning and short-term planning. (See slides three and four.) Long-term planning produces advantages which make it an important part of the planning process. The existence of long-term plans permits an organization time to modify and test its plans as the planning cycle progresses and permits incremental modification of existing plans. The long-term planning also affords the planning organization an opportunity to mobilize and correctly allocate resources to maximize results and permits development of a plan that can be coordinated and thoroughly reviewed. Another advantage of long-term planning is the flexibility it permits. The planner is able to evaluate plans and integrate modifications as circumstances change. The disadvantages of long-term planning are resource conflicts between on-going operations, short-term needs and the lack of specific data in the initial planning stages. Additionally, long-term planning risks allocating resources that will produce results over the long term, but may be misused because of subsequent technological developments or changes in requirements or priorities. Finally, current events that were totally unexpected can negate the validity of long-term plans. Short-term plans, on the other hand, have the advantage of being based on factual information which increases the probability that the plan will produce the desired results. The disadvantage of short-term planning lies in the inability of the planner to substantially change or alter the plan when time is a critical factor.

Overall, the panel agreed that there must be both long and short term planning. The challenge is to have a balanced planning program that takes advantage of the strengths of each type plan and range of planning activity.

Operations Management Principles: Due to lengthy discussion on other topics, the panel confined its efforts to developing principles and techniques that can be used to facilitate operations management. All panel members agreed that a primary purpose of operations management was to maximize results from resources and to efficiently and effectively accomplish the mission. For complete listing of operations management principles and techniques developed, see slide five.

PANEL III SLIDES

16 January 1980

Slide 1 CRITICAL FACTORS

- Threat
- Country Resources
- National Interest

Slide 2 OTHER FACTORS

- State of Readiness
- Mobilization Capability
- Sustaining Capabilities
- Outside Support
- Environment
- Internal Security

Slide 3 LONG-TERM PLANNING

Advantages

- Deliberate Effort
- Time
- Mobilization
- Coordination
- Resources Allocation
- Flexible

Disadvantages

- Resource Conflicts
- Generalities
- Risk
- Affected by Short Term

Slide 4 SHORT TERM PLANNING

Advantage

- Factual

Disadvantages

- Conflict with resources
- Limited flexibility

Slide 5 OPERATIONS MANAGEMENT - Principles and Techniques

- Unity of Command
- Span of Control
- Maintain Reserve
- Delegation of Authority
- Flexible
- Morale
- Centralized vs Decentralized
- Priorities
- Use of ADP
- Manpower Management
- Delineation of Responsibilities

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - III

PANEL DISCUSSION TOPICS AND REPORTS

THURSDAY - 17 January 1980

"Special and Combined Operations"

PANEL #1

DISCUSSION TOPICS: 17 January 1980

1. Joint and Combined Operations
2. Doctrine/Command and Staff Procedures
3. Interoperability and Standardization

Joint and Combined Operations: Joint exercises are those exercises executed by two or more services of the same country. These may include armed forces or police forces. Combined exercises are exercises executed by the services of two or more nations joining together. Joint Exercises are inter-service, while combined exercises are international.

There are many problems associated with joint exercises: doctrine, terminology, operational, logistical and conventional procedures; and varieties of weapons systems and equipment. In addition when you conduct combined exercises between nations, not only are the above problems accentuated, but additional problems include: cultural/social, language, and political problems. Intelligence sensitivities invariably become critical during combined operations.

A third type of operation was advanced: that is, the coordinated operation. A coordinated operation may be an operation between two friendly countries operating along their mutual or contiguous border. In a coordinated operation no questions of command and control, operational areas or doctrine arise. However, cultural/social language and political problems are ever present.

Armies when operating together on joint/combined exercises must have an understanding and awareness of the sensitivities of each others' political situation, cultural/social customs, and language. In addition, careful consideration must be given to intelligence sensitivities.

Prior decisions need to be made of level of classification and exchange of intelligence information to avoid misunderstandings.

Some solutions to solving joint and combined operational problems are: to formulate committees to study and agree upon common solutions; to formulate command doctrine and procedures at staff colleges; to cooperate and coordinate in detail; conduct joint and combined operations to resolve problems; have exchange programs (personnel and unit) between services and countries; and provide adequate liaison, when necessary.

Doctrine/Command and Staff Procedures: Most armies have a body of joint and combined doctrine. Those that do not should strive to write such doctrine. Even though joint committees have tried to standardize doctrine, procedures and terminology, success has not been complete.

The exchange of staff college instructors and students has gone a long way in standardizing doctrine and procedures among Western bloc countries. This activity is encouraged and should be expanded.

Committee meetings, both interservice and international, can assist in solving joint/combined doctrinal and procedural problems. The standard NATO agreements (STANAG), the ABCA (Australia, Britain, Canada and America), and the ANZUS Planning Manual are small steps in standardizing doctrine and procedures.

The advantages of having standard doctrine and procedures are many: orders and directives are easy to understand and execute; solves training and logistic problems; leads to successful organization and operation of unified commands, and assists in overcoming multilingual and multiracial problems.

Working out the problems of standardized doctrine are time consuming. It is difficult to reach agreement on the complex issues. The individual service and country loses its independence and identity in standardization.

Standardization and Interoperability: It was generally agreed that future wars will pit the West versus Communism. Standardization and interoperability among Western armies and equipment is a necessity.

It is virtually impossible for some countries to abandon totally their own systems and to set up new systems strictly for standardization. In addition, some countries' industrial and economic base require the local production of non-standard equipment. Some standardization and trade-off between countries is possible.

Technology also complicates standardization and interoperability. A new piece of equipment dictates a certain new doctrine and system. Countries are not even or equal on technology.

Productive and beneficial areas of standardization and interoperability include doctrine, operational, logistical and training concepts and staff procedures. Equipment standardization and interoperability may never be achieved but it is a worthy goal for those who desire to participate in coalition warfare.

PANEL II

Discussion Topics: 17 January 1980

1. The Role of the Military in Nation Building
2. Civic Action Operations
3. Civilian-Military Relations

The Role of the Military in Nation Building and Civic Action:
Building on the firm foundation of trust and respect established during the first two days of discussions, Panel II had a most interesting exchange of ideas about the third day's topics.

Panel members agreed that the military can perform a key role in nation building. As the nation develops, the role of the military diminishes. Numerous examples were cited to illustrate the variety of ideas presented by the panel members. Overall, the panel decided the military's most important contribution is to provide a secure environment in which a nation can develop.

The positive value of military training in nation building was cited by many panel members. A new nation often finds the military a focal point for the development of a sense of identity and a feeling of national unity. Universal military training was felt to be a valuable tool in developing patriotism and pride in the nation.

Caution is also needed to insure that military action does not become the primary tool in nation building. Excessive involvement in civic action and other nation building activities can seriously detract from military readiness and decrease the military's ability to perform its primary mission of national defense. Panel members agreed that careful consideration must be given to social and economic conditions when determining the degree of military involvement in nation building activities. See Slide 1 for key points of the role of the military in nation building.

Direct involvement of the local people in civic action projects was seen as the key to success. The military should provide the stimulus, but local support should be mustered to insure projects become self-sustaining and do not require long-term military support. See Slide 2 for key points identified in conducting civic action.

Civilian-Military Relations: The topic of civilian-military relations was extremely interesting and elicited many thought-provoking suggestions from the officers on the panel. A key element identified was the close and continuous civil-military interface at all levels. Joint military-civilian standing committees to examine common problems and provide a forum for airing grievances is a highly effective method for such interface. Constant attention by military leaders to insure sensitivity to the impact of the military presence on the civil sector was noted to be of great importance. See slide 3 for key points on civil-military relations.

The panel concluded its three day's discussions in high spirits. Mutual understanding was greatly enhanced by the discussions. All panel members agreed that the discussions had been professionally stimulating and that PAMS as an institution should become a permanent fixture in the Asia-Pacific area.

PANEL II SLIDES

SLIDE 1

The Role of the Military in Nation Building

- Provide a secure environment in which the nation can develop
- Security and stability attracts foreign investment which aids economic growth
- Military efforts should concentrate on least secure areas
- Civilian sector should have the primary role in nation building
- Military is a training ground for future leaders
- Universal military training of all youths aids in developing a sense of national unity
- Military training can build a national identity by promoting patriotism and pride in nation
- Military training increases overall national labor force skill level
- Pitfalls
 - Military doing too much therefore reducing stimulus for development in the civilian sector
 - Too much civic action detracts from military readiness
 - Political misuse of military civic action efforts
 - Favoritism for special interest groups
 - Improper channeling of government funds
 - Taking jobs away from civilians
 - Morale suffers if soldiers are constantly employed in hard jobs or dangerous areas
 - Too much third country assistance causing resentment
 - Military assistance should be limited by funds made available with stringent financial controls
 - Social and economic conditions should govern degree of military assistance given

SLIDE 2

Civic Action Operations

- Should be for limited term only
- Use joint civil-military committees to plan projects
- Insure support of the people by having them participate thru contributions of labor, material, or money
- Projects should concentrate on basic human needs - food, clothing, and shelter
- Many civic action projects aid both civil and military sectors
- Military assistance with vocational training aids nation building
- Let the people set the priorities for civic action assistance
- Let the people initiate requests for civic action projects
- Strive to provide technical advice and special equipment rather than do all the work
- Build local pride in the project so it can become self-sustaining
- Military engineer and medical units are key civic action resources

SLIDE 3

- Two-way communication is important
- Establish civil-military interface at all levels
- Good interpersonal relationships are essential
- Be sensitive to the economic impact of the presence of military units in a civilian area
- Be sensitive to ethnic conflicts and language difficulties
- Insure long-term military commitment to maintaining good relations with civilian sector

SLIDE 3 continued

- Techniques to improve civil-military relationships
- Military units adopt schools or orphanages
- Provide military personnel to assist with teaching in schools
- Civic action projects
- Restore historic sites
- Disaster relief operations
- Establish long-term standing civil-military grievance committees
- Invite civilian community to visit military camps
- Civilian-military sports competition

PANEL III

Discussion Topics: 17 January 1980

1. Special Military Operations
2. Reserve/Territorial Forces
3. Command and Control

Special Military Operations: Panel members decided to confine their discussion to one type special military operation, rear area security. The panel concluded that its first task was to define the term "rear area security" due to the differences between rear area security in conventional operations and unconventional (insurgency) operations. After recognizing that there are major differences between these two types of rear area security operations, the panel confined its major efforts to discussions of conventional rear area security. The panel discussed the factors that influence the types of forces required and types of operations to be conducted in order to provide conventional rear area security. The factors identified and discussed are shown at slide 1. Rear area security, by its nature, is an economy of force operation. Consequently, tenant units in rear areas must be able not only to perform their normal mission, but also be prepared to act as security or reaction forces. To insure an integrated rear area security effort, the panel concluded that there must be one commander, who has overall responsibility for designated rear areas. This commander requires some staff assistance in dealing with the rear area security mission and to insure close coordination between his headquarters, reaction forces, the police and other civilian agencies. Key points are shown on slide 2.

Reserve/Territorial Forces: The panel recognized that reserve forces and territorial forces are different in their role and functions. Reserve forces are generally civilians who are also part-time soldiers. As contrasted to reservists, territorial forces are normally full-time soldiers under the command of a regional commander who routinely operates in a specified area. These territorial forces are not normally under the national army's control except during mobilization. In its discussions, the panel found that other countries have territorial forces who are also full time soldiers, but who operate under the control of a regional commander subject to the orders of the national army commander. Thereafter, the panel narrowed its efforts to deal with reserve forces. The three main roles identified for reserves

are to augment regular forces, to save money and manpower and to provide a force able to augment local authorities (slide 3). The panel concluded that if these forces are to effectively augment the regular force, they must be capable of being integrated into the regular force structure in times of emergency in an efficient and timely manner. This requires advance planning and an organizational structure capable of assuming mobilization responsibility. Desirably, reserve forces should be under the command of an active force commander who is responsible for insuring reserve forces are organized, trained, and equipped the same as the regular forces. See slide 4.

Command and Control. The panel recognized a need for increased command and control in view of the complexities of modern warfare and weapon lethality. Several of the items that impact on this increased need are listed on slide 5. The sophistication of the battlefield caused by increased mobility as well as technical breakthroughs in the electronic warfare field have made the modern battlefield a difficult place for effective command and control. Battle areas and span of control have expanded, which has made command and control difficult and imposed additional requirements upon the Commander. Coupled with all of these requirements is a reduced reaction time due to the speed of the battle which highlights the necessity for more effective, secure communications.

PANEL III SLIDES

Slide 1

Rear Area Security - Factors

- Economy of force
- Law and Order
- Secure Key facilities
- Pacification
- Rehabilitation
- Medical Aid
- Public Information
- Size of area
- Loyalty of population
- Availability of combat forces

Slide 2

Rear Area Security - Organization

- Reaction force
- Integrated Defense
- Area commander
- Integration of police
- Reserve force mission
- Civilian liaison

slide 3

Reserve/Territorial Force - Role

- Augment regular force
- Save money and manpower
- Augment local authorities

Slide 4

Reserve/Territorial Force - Integration

- Single commander
- Organization
- Training methods and techniques
- Equipment compatibility

Slide 5

Command and Control

- Sophisticated battlefield
- Expanded battle area
- Increased number of units
- Reaction time

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - III

14-18 January 1980

HONOLULU, HAWAII

REPORT OF THE PLANNING AND STEERING COMMITTEES

REPORT OF THE PLANNING AND STEERING COMMITTEES

1. The Planning Committee, comprised of a delegate from each nation represented, met on 14 and 16 January 1980. The Chairman was Colonel Robert J. Wallace. Areas discussed by the committee included future hosts, locations, dates, themes, format and attendance.

a. The committee recommended participants continue to be at the mid-manager level. It was agreed that, when possible, a participant from each country at PAMS III also attend PAMS IV. That will allow the country delegation to be more productive quickly and provide a point of contact between PAMS.

b. The consensus was to continue to have PAMS at intervals of about nine or ten months. The committee recommended PAMS IV be held in late November or early December 1980.

c. The Philippines expressed an interest in being the host for PAMS IV. The subject has been referred to Philippine higher headquarters. It was agreed that a decision should be made not later than mid-March 1980. If the Philippines are unable to host PAMS IV, the United States agreed to be the host in Hawaii in late November.

d. The following themes for PAMS IV were discussed:

- (1) Insurgency
- (2) Organizational Management and Effectiveness
- (3) Mobilization Management
- (4) Territorial Management

Committee recommended the theme for PAMS IV should be "Insurgency" as was also recommended by the PAMS II Planning Committee. Committee also recommended "Organization Management and Effectiveness" as the theme for PAMS V.

e. The committee recommended that in addition to the theme topic and topics related to the theme, that a special subject of general interests be included in the agenda of each PAMS.

f. The committee recommended the location and host of PAMS V be deferred pending a decision on the location and host nation for PAMS IV.

2. The Steering Committee, comprised of a delegate from each nation represented, met on 15 and 18 January 1980. The Chairman was Colonel Nolan M. Sigler. The committee discussed the findings and recommendations of the Planning Committee concerning PAMS IV and policy modifications needed to improve subsequent seminars.

a. The committee concurred in the recommendation that PAMS IV be convened during the November-December 1980 timeframe, with a specific date to be established by reiterative messages from the Secretariat to all Asia-Pacific army representatives and decided by mid-March 1980. It was further agreed that either Manila or Honolulu would be suitable sites and that if the Philippines elected not to host the conference, the US would do so. The US agreed that, in either case, it would provide a Secretariat Coordinating Officer to assist the host army in administration of PAMS IV.

b. The committee concluded that the format and sequence of PAMS IV should be patterned after that of previous seminars, but that the daily starting time should be changed to 0900 in view of the social activities scheduled during evening hours.

c. The committee examined PAMS IV themes proposed by the Planning Committee and concluded that insurgency, defined as a fundamental problem and remedied by the application of internal security (defense) capabilities should be the title and theme of PAMS IV and that "Mobilization Management", "Territorial Management" and "Interoperability" should be subordinate topics that should be examined in the context of insurgency (internal defense). The committee discussed the current Asia-Pacific environment and concluded that insurgency (internal defense) should be redefined in light of recent developments in that area. This redefinition should take account of both latent and active insurgencies; the domestic and external origins of insurgency, along with the motives of the perpetrator and the preventive and remedial measures, both socio-economic and military, available to ground forces. The committee then concluded that, against the redefined insurgency, there should be an examination of the interaction among the army, other defense forces and civil institutions to identify army training, planning, and other preparatory requirements. Finally, it was agreed that PAMS IV should examine insurgency as a single army endeavor and as a collective (multinational) army endeavor in order to define actions necessary to improve interoperability among the armies of the Asia-Pacific area.

d. The committee concluded that, apart from insurgency, PAMS IV should feature a presentation on training (not to exceed a half day) with emphasis on simulation and other economic training methods and that a corollary subject of "How to Equip Small Armies Having No Domestic Production Capability in the Most Cost Effective Manner" -- should also be addressed.

e. It was agreed that the seminar should examine within the time limits provided, the concept of "friendly cooperation among armies" and "counter-amphibious doctrine" as applicable to insurgency as well as the role of ground (army forces) in the Asia-Pacific area since it is widely considered to be only a naval/air theater of operations.

f. It was agreed that a series of papers, covering definitions and concepts as well as contemplated solutions be distributed in advance of the seminar so that all participants would possess a common definition and an understanding of the different staff systems, logistics support systems, command and control system, etc., used by the Asia-Pacific armies. It was further concluded that a glossary of terms ought to be prepared and distributed in like fashion, derived from terms proposed by all armies and subsequent distribution of a proposed definition by the Secretariat.

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
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PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - III

18. January 1980

CLOSING REMARKS

MAJOR GENERAL HERBERT E. WOLFF
COMMANDER, US ARMY WESTERN COMMAND

Major General Wolff PAMS Dinner Remarks

In your closing remarks earlier this afternoon, you told us collectively what you think of PAMS and what you derived from PAMS III. To me that was a humbling experience because of the profoundness of your comments and for the encouragement you have given us. We are grateful for your remarks.

As you might expect, my staff provided me a summary of the scholarly and meaningful conclusions you reached at this seminar. But, I think that it would be inappropriate for me to repeat those, because they are your conclusions. They are your findings and you are thoroughly familiar with them. They will be published shortly and will represent the challenges you met, the work you have done so well and the contributions you made. So rather than review that part of your work here, I thought I would touch on a different area,--break, if you will, some new ground.

There was in our country a biographer, a journalist, an historian by the name of Douglas Southall Freeman who won the Pulitzer Prize for the volumes he wrote on a famous general who was not victorious -- Robert E. Lee. Not only did he write the biographies of that famous general in our country, but he also wrote volumes which were published in 1944 called Lee's Lieutenants which have taken their place on bookshelves next to other classic military volumes such as the biography of Napoleon, Clausewitz's principles of war and Sun Tzu's advice on "how to win."

In my mind, Mr. Freeman was more than just a historian and a journalist. He was also a major contributor to the military profession. And for that reason, I paid particular attention to an interview conducted with him the year before he died in 1952. At that time, he recorded for history his thoughts that if he had been a painter rather than a writer, he would have wanted to paint a portrait of General Lee that portrayed General Lee sitting beside a dirt road studying a map while his troops marched to the front line. Because, as Freeman explained, that would have signified the most important thing a commander has to do--that is to study and plan while his troops are moving. It signified what Freeman considered to be the difference between winning and losing a battle. He said the difference was not the preponderance of force, but in the intangibles of leadership.

There are perhaps some of you here who would disagree with that point of view, or with certain parts of that portrait, but I think none of us would disagree with the fact that leadership in the military profession needs to study, needs to learn, needs to provide the quality of leadership that the troops under them are entitled to expect. They are entitled to the best possible management of their talents that we can give them.

Your keynote speaker referred to a book, The American Caesar by Manchester about General MacArthur which contains a passage about a meeting between General MacArthur and the man who was at that time MacArthur's competitor or rival, Admiral Nimitz. General MacArthur is reported to have turned to Admiral Nimitz and said, "Admiral, I hope you will remember that among professionals every conversation is an education." I think that this dialogue has pertinence to our PAMS. Because you are professionals, I am sure you have found during the past week that every conversation is indeed an education. I say that with certainty based on your concluding comments this afternoon.

In PAMS I and II we devoted considerable time to understanding threats and the role that threat plays in the management process. In PAMS III, in view of the help the Soviet Union has given us in Afghanistan, there was not much need to dwell on threat identification. One of you wisely observed that there is great similarity between what we see today and what we saw in the years immediately preceding World War II. I am speaking about the invasion of the Saar in 1936, the Sudetenland in 1938 and the invasion of Austria and Czechoslovakia by Nazi Germany in September 1939 which ultimately led to World War II. We have learned the lessons since then. The question is--will we apply those lessons? One thing is sure; today, there is no question about our understanding the threat. We talk about it -- recognize it and I believe we will find a way to deal with it.

Another topic that captured our attention during PAMS III was knowing our mission. Here General Perera came to our aid. He addressed the mission of his army and amplified our keynote speaker's remarks on the role of military forces. Both reminded us that we are servants of our governments and our people. It is our mission to know how to go to war and how to make our armies an instrument of national development. Today, General Otis also added that we must know what we need in the context of what we can afford. These are novel mission statements, but are all a part of our mission.

The next point I want to make concerns our commitment to friends. Here we realize that in this vast Pacific region; there is no such thing as an insignificant friend. Every friend is important, every friend is significant. That led us to think in terms of what we would want to do in PAMS IV -- to talk more about interoperability and talk more about the kind of standardization mentioned by General Otis. As you know, General Otis referred to the need for standardization that permits us to use the same fuel to fill our tanks and operate our vehicles.

In regard to our commitment to our friends, I am happy to point out that there are signs of progress. Certainly, Admiral Long underscored that. We have come a long way in the last three years in putting into action what we only previously said with words. In May 1978 our Vice-President, Mr. Mondale, said it with the statement that the United States is unalterably a Pacific power. In 1979 he said it when he visited some of your countries and referred to the United States as a global power. We realize that there is no such thing as a conflict with the Communist world limited to only Europe or NATO. That conflict will be fought from the Danzig Corridor all the way to Vladivostok. It will involve all of us.

The commitment to our friends is essential. It was underscored by our President in a letter to Prime Minister Kriangsak of Thailand when the threat to the Thai border was obvious. The commitment made in that letter said that the United States would not stand by idly when the liberty, the freedom and the integrity of Thailand were threatened.

As you know, we talked briefly during PAMS III about mobilization planning and mobilization capacity which reminded us of the comments made by two of our featured speakers who said that we must think in terms of complementarity of equipment. None of us is rich enough and powerful enough to do it alone. None of us can afford to have all the equipment we would like to have. Therefore, we need to think in complementary terms, dynamic regionalism and forms of military interface. You reached the conclusion that we will all end up being stronger and better prepared for the inevitable through cooperation.

These are some of the things which derived from your discussions. These are part of the mosaic and part of the patchwork put together by our featured speakers that you recognized in your closing remarks. You said it has been a valuable week, a memorable week, a rewarding week, a

professionally satisfying week. Some of you mentioned the fine work done by those who work behind the scenes, who administer PAMS and spend many hours getting everything ready. I assure you that as a result of your comments, there is only one response from all of us -- that it was obviously time well spent. We bask in the sunshine of your satisfaction. We also have learned and profited from your contributions which makes all our efforts worthwhile. I want to thank you for committing your resource of time to this endeavor and building on the foundation established by those who preceded you. In turn, I want to commit WESTCOM to building on the foundation you have built.

At this time, I want to present each of you a memento of the time you spent with us -- a certificate of your participation in the Third Pacific Armies Management Seminar. As I call your name, please come forward so we may recognize each of you. Thank you.

LIST OF PRESENTATIONS*

- "Civic Action"
Lt Col DOTAONA and Lt Col HUAI, Papua New Guinea
- "Training Soldiers for Civilian Trades"
Lieutenant A.F. MA'ATU, Tonga
- "Fundamentals of Staff Organization and Functions"
Lt Col ARIFF and Lt Col HEW, Malaysia
- "Planning and Managing a National Service Army"
Major CHEN and Captain YEO, Singapore
- "Task Organization of Forces"
Colonel PRAMON, Thailand
- "Application of Management Techniques to Operational Planning"
Colonel BRAUNER, Philippines
- "Management Approach to Contingency Planning"
Lt Col(P) GERGULIS, US Army
- "Training and Operations of UN Peacekeeping Forces"
Lt Col WILLIAMS, Fiji
- "Operations Management of Territorial Forces"
Colonel NANA, Indonesia
- "Training and Operations Update"
Lt Col(P) TATE, US Army
- "Automation in Planning and Operations"
Colonel WALLACE, US Army
- "The Training and Education Management Program for Republic of Korea Officers' Corps"
Colonel SUNG, Korea

*Note: These presentations are not included in this text due to their length. However, copies of the presentations will be provided with the PAMS addendum containing Lieutenant General Glenn K. Otis' remarks.

PACIFIC ARMIES MANAGEMENT SEMINAR - III

14-18 January 1980

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